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V I I 
STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter under Section 78-
2a-3(j) Utah Code Annotated (1953). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
(Including standards of appellate review and supporting authority.) 
ISSUE ON APPEAL: DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN 
DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT, CLAIMS AND 
CAUSES OF ACTION WHERE THE DEFENDANTS ADMIT TO 
MULTIPLE CIVIL AND CRIMINAL VIOLATIONS OF THE 
UTAH MOTOR VEHICLE ACT AND OTHER LAWS 
RESPECTING COMMERCE IN MOTOR VEHICLES. 
Applicable Standard of Appellate Review. The material facts of this case 
are not significantly disputed, therefore the Trial Courts' interpretation of those 
facts are questions of law. The conclusions of law drawn from the Trial Courts' 
interpretations are reviewed by the Court of Appeals for correctness and afforded 
no deference. Woodhaven Apt v. Washington, 942 P.2d 918 (Utah 1997); 
Diversified Equities v. American Sav. & Loan, 739 P.2d 1133 (Utah App. 1987) 
and Reed v. Alvey, 616 P.2d 1374 (Utah 1980). The legal effect of particular facts 
is within the province of the Appellate Court and no deference is given to the Trial 
Courts' determinations. Drake v. Industrial Com'n of Utah, 939 P.2d 177 (Utah 
1997) 
Questions of contract interpretation, not requiring resort to extrinsic 
evidence, are matters of law and on such questions the Appellate Court accords the 
Trial Courts' interpretation no presumption of correctness. Sackler v. Savin, 897 
1 
P.2d 1217 (Utah 1995); Zions First Nat'l Bank v. National Am. Title Ins. Co., 749 
P.2d 651 (Utah 1988). When a trial court's rulings are based upon a 
misunderstanding or misapplication of the law, where a correct one would have 
produced a different result, the party adversely affected is entitled to have the error 
rectified in a proper adjudication under correct principle of law. Reed, 616 P.2d 
1374 (Utah 1980); Farris v. Jennings, 595 P.2d 857 (Utah 1979) and Cummings v. 
Nielson, 42 Utah 157,129 Pac. 619 (1912). 
Preservation of Issue: The plaintiffs complaint alleged that the 
defendants violated the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act, the Utah Motor 
Vehicle Act and the Utah Uniform Commercial Code. 
STATUTES INTERPRETATIONS WHICH ARE OF DETERMINATIVE 
AND CENTRAL IMPORTANCE ON THE APPEAL 
The plaintiffs seek an interpretation and application of the statutes cited 
herein to the facts of their case. The statutes that require interpretation are the 
Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act, the Utah Motor Vehicle Act, and the Utah 
Uniform Commercial Code. These statutes are reproduced in Addendum A of this 
brief, as recognized by Rule 24 Briefs (a) (6) and (11), Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure: 
The Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act sections requiring interpretation 
are: Sections 13-11-2,13-11-3 (2) and (6), 13-11-4 (1), (2)(a-j), 13-11-5,13-11-19 
(1), (2) and (5) and 13-11-23, Utah Code Annotated (1953). 
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The Utah Motor Vehicle Act sections requiring interpretation are: Sections 
41-la-102 (13, 33, 40, 46, 50, & 66), 41-3-102 (8, 17, 22, & 24), 41-3-201, 41-3-
202, 41-3-205 (1, 2, & 3), 41-3-208, 41-3-210 (l)(a, b, c, d, 1, m, n), 41-3-404, 41-
3-701, 41-3-702 (l)(b)(ii), 41-3-702 (l)(b)(iv), 41-3-702 (l)(c)(iv), 41-3-702 
(l)(c)(vii), 41-3-702 (3), (4) & (5), Utah Code Annotated (1953). 
Utah Uniform Commercial Code sections requiring interpretation are: 
Sections 70A-1-102, 70A-1-103, 70A-1-106, 70A-1-201(3, 10, 11, 19, 25 & 27), 
70A-1203, 70A-2-103 (l)(a, b, & d), 70A-2-104(l), 70A-2-302 (1) & (2), 70A-2-
313 (l)(a & b), (2), 70A-2-314 (1), (2) and (3), 70A-2-315, 70A-2-513 (1 - 4), 
70A-2-714, 70A-2-715 and 70A-2-719 (1 - 3), Utah Code Annotated 1953). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This case involves the Plaintiffs/Appellants James K. Rawson, trustee, and 
Rebecca R. Rawson, Trustee, ("Plaintiffs"), efforts to recover damages against the 
Defendants/Appellees, Kim Edward Conover, Karen Jane Conover, a Utah general 
partnership, dba K& K Sales, K & K Sales Inc., Kim Edward Conover, dba K & K 
Sales Inc., Paul W. Clark and Old Republic Surety Co ("Defendants"). Kim 
Edward Conover ("Conover") was a licensed and bonded motor vehicle dealer 
doing business under the various assumed names listed and identified above. Old 
Republic Surety Co. ("Old Republic") is Conover's bonding company. Plaintiffs 
seek recovery of the damages they sustained based upon the defendants' multiple 
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admissions concerning violations of both the civil and criminal provisions of the 
Utah Motor Vehicle Act and other laws respecting commerce in motor vehicles. 
On or about October 14, 1992 the defendants Conover and Clark, acting in 
concert with one another and using Conover's license as a motor vehicle dealer, 
purchased the motor vehicle ("subject vehicle") which is the subject of these 
proceedings from Western Auto Wrecking, Inc. At the time they purchased the 
subject vehicle they knew the same had been declared a total loss salvage motor 
vehicle. Following their purchase of the subject vehicle, Clark and Conover 
undertook to repair substantial and significant frame and body damage thereto, but 
such repairs were incomplete, improper or unprofessionally preformed and as a 
consequence the subject vehicle was unsafe to operate. 
Plaintiffs' complaint sought relief for Clark's and Conover's 
misrepresentations and omissions undertaken and carried out with an intent to 
defraud (Count I); thgough tortuous misrepresentation (Count II); and deceptive 
and unconscionable acts and practices, (Count III). Clark's and Conover's breach 
of express and implied warranties (Count IV); breach of the covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing (Count V); the liability of Old Republic Surety Co., (Count VI); 
punitive damages (Count VII); and equitable estoppel (Count VIII) were likewise 
sought. (R. 95-112.) 
The defendants admit selling the subject vehicle to on or about August 3, 
1993 to plaintiffs (R. 12, 5, 35.) They denied knowing the subject vehicle was 
4 
improperly, unprofessionally or incompletely repaired and alleged that the 
plaintiffs knowingly and willingly purchased the subject vehicle by acknowledging 
that the same was a rebuilt salvage (R. 6, 35.) The defendants also asserted that 
the plaintiffs assumed any and all risks concerning the subject vehicle in that they 
had "...inspected the vehicle to [their] satisfaction and purchases the vehicle as is" 
(R. 39.) 
Plaintiffs' appeal from the Trial Court's Order On Defendants' Motion For 
Summary Judgment, dated October 4, 1996 (R. 287 - 291) and Order On 
Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment, dated May 28,1998 (R. 423 -425.) 
Course of Proceedings and Trial Court Disposition 
Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment, dated May 31,1996 (R. 163 -
165) was briefed, opposed (R. 214 - 242) and argued before Judge Pat B. Brian on 
August 2, 1996 (R. 274.) Plaintiff's Notice Of Objections To Proposed Order On 
Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment, dated August 28, 1996 (R. 275 -
283) precipitated re-argument of Defendants Motion For Summary Judgment 
before the Court on October 4, 1996 (R. 292 - 293.) Based upon the Court's 
admitted predisposition with respect to the material issues which were the subject 
of these proceeding, plaintiffs also objected to the Court's ruling on the issues 
which were the subject of the proposed Order On Defendants' Motion For 
Summary Judgment. On November 1, 1996 the Court recused itself from this case 
and the matter was assigned to Judge Glen K. Iwasaki (R. 294 - 295.) 
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Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment, dated March 9, 1998 (R. 341 
-343) was likewise briefed (R. 344 - 354, 372 - 407), opposed and argued before 
the Court on April 16, 1998 (R. 413.) Plaintiffs' Notice Of Objections To Order 
On Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment, dated May 6, 1998 (R. 417 -
420) and Plaintiffs' Notice Of Objections To Defendants' Bill Of Costs, dated 
May 6,1998 (R. 415 - 416) were duly filed with the Court and served herein. On 
June 23,1998 plaintiffs filed their Notice of Appeal (R. 413 - 433.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. The following facts relevant to the issue presented for review are 
established by the record herein. 
1. Conover was at all material times herein: 
a) A licensed and bonded, motor vehicle dealer with many years of 
experience in the repair and sale of salvage and non-salvage motor vehicles (R. 2, 
60.) 
b) A partner with his wife, co-defendant Karen Jane Conover ("KJ. 
Conover"), in a general partnership doing business as K & K Sales ("K & K 
Sales"), engaged in business as a licensed motor vehicle dealer (R. 60.) 
c) A co-owner with co-defendant Paul W. Clark ("Clark"), KJ. 
Conover and K & K Sales in a general partnership, joint venture and common 
enterprise ("Joint Enterprise") that repaired, advertised, displayed and sold the 
subject vehicle, VIN 1FMDA31U5KZB04673 to plaintiff (R. 373.) 
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d) An owner of K & K Sales, Inc., a corporation ("K & K Inc.") having 
its principle office and place of business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
engaged in the business of a motor vehicle dealer (R. 120.) 
e) One of the owners of the subject vehicle at all material times prior to 
plaintiffs' purchase of the same (R. 185.) 
2. K.J. Conover was at all material times herein: 
a) A partner with her husband, co-defendant Conover, in K & K Sales 
(R. 407.) 
b) A co-owner of K & K Inc (R. 233.) 
3. Clark was at all material times herein: 
a) An unlicensed, unbonded, motor vehicle salesman for Conover, KJ. 
Conover, K & K Sales and K & K Inc (R. 391.) 
b) A co-owner in the Joint Enterprise of repairing, marketing and 
selling the subject vehicle to plaintiffs (R. 201.) 
c) The person who personally financed, repaired, advertised, displayed 
and acted as the salesman for the Joint Enterprise in connection with the sale of the 
subject vehicle to plaintiffs (R. 201, 251 - 253.) 
d) The person who advanced the purchase money used to acquire the 
subject vehicle and one of its owners prior to selling it to plaintiffs (R. 201.) 
4. Old Republic Surety Co., ("Old Rebuplic") was at all material times 
herein duly qualified to transact business as a surety company in the State of Utah. 
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Old Re tor K & K Sales, which was in full force and 
effect at all material time 
§• The defendants, through and uy »K ^e, 
jointly acted as (a) a "Supplier" under the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act 
("S^ and (b) a "Merchant" under the Utah Uniform Commercial 
Code ("Commercial Code") 
6. Plaintiffs were induced h) ' ihc <h IVndnnls ^. ne subject 
vehicle by the defendants placement of an advertisement it p;*|n i in 
which plaintiffs responded by contracting Clark at Clark's home where the subject 
riven and sold to plaintiffs (R, 251 • 251,) 
#. i nui vehicle was purchased by 
and titled in the name of K & K Sales. All repairs in ih< NiiIi|t-< i V 11 dele were 
performed in the name of K & K Sales in order for the Joint Enterprise 1 
(inv ii^ ,'im I 'I.ill State sales tax relating to Clark's purchase of the subject vehicle 
as required h ,IN (IV 'ill I 
8. • ' Notwithstanding the I'm i Unit Hi< sul»i"•i vehicle had been involved 
in a serious accident that resulted in it being declared a salv u»e mph i * '.'hide i»" >i 
the defendants* purchase and repair of the same, the Joint Enterprise failei > 
safely, coimpldcly, adequately or professionally repair the damage. (R. 245, 366, 
402 - 203.) The subject \ chich i n: .: .subsequently sold to plaintiffs with the 
incomplete, improper and unprofessional rcpiur* "<T» ''orn -/aim I \ the exterior 
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skin and bodywork the Joint Enterprise caused to be performed on the subject 
vehicle prior to its sale to plaintiffs. (R. 245, 402 - 403.) 
9. Clark failed to inform plaintiffs of the facts concerning the subject 
vehicle's unsafe, inadequate and incomplete repairs. Clark however offered his 
personal guarantee that he had properly repaired the subject vehicle and that the 
same was fit for use as a passenger car and for plaintiffs particular purposes (R. 
370.) 
10. Defendants knew or should have known the subject vehicle's crush 
zones, collapse zones and structural integrity were not properly repaired or 
restored by reason of the minimal repairs they caused to be performed on the same. 
The costs the defendants incurred in connection with their repairs and the fact that 
the nature and extent of the defective repairs were hidden under the subject 
vehicle's outer skin evidence the defendants failures to re-manufacture, re-
construct and restore the subject vehicle to meet industry and manufacturer's 
standards and specifications. (R. 201, 245, 402 - 403.) 
11. Clark personally financed, advertised, displayed and sold the subject 
vehicle from Clark's home in violation of the provisions of the Utah Motor 
Vehicle Act (R. 360.) 
12. Following plaintiffs decision to purchase the subject vehicle, 
Conover prepared all of the purchase documents which falsely reflected that the 
subject vehicle was owned only by K & K Sales, that it was part of K & K Sales' 
9 
dealer nr nlm iii.il w !•• ilIv Iwh «l !•» reflect Clark's ownership interest therein (R. 
370.) 
13. Following plaintiffs purchase of the subject vehicle the Hffs 
were involved in an accident. When repairs resulting from the accident were 
attempted, the magnitude of the incomplete, inadequate, unprofessional and unsafe 
rep Ait s iterprise became obvious when 
the subject vehicle's outer skin v 
14. After the subject vehicle was disassembled, it was inspected by the 
repair shop it had been taken,, to, by plaintiffs' insurance adjuster, b) an 
ifivrsiigiifn-f 1'i.im lh.< M.il.^ i "\ ehicle Enforcement Division of the Utah State Tax 
Commission and others Each person vim np^uvlnl llic suhjrU vehicle concluded 
that the repairs made by or at the direction of the Joint Enterprise WH"" deft , iivr 
and unsafe and that the cost of restoring the subject vehicle to safe operation 
exceeded its fair market value. (R. 245,401 - 402.) 
I "I.ii in(iff:1.1, were forced to sell the subject vehicle for salvage parts and 
did so after notifying the defend,1111, , I phimlills inlenl In M II (he same. ) 
' ' Defendants refused to return plaintiffs purchase price nr i perh m 
the needed and required repairs to the subject vehicle so that it could be operated 
saiVly consislcn Clark's personal guarantee. (R. 366.) 
i Defenda* action concerning their 
breaches of civil and criminal provisions 
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contractual duties owed by each of them to plaintiffs and their breaches of the laws 
respecting commerce in motor vehicles. As a result plaintiffs filing of this lawsuit 
in order to obtain the remedies provided by law. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Utah has adopted a comprehensive set of laws respecting commerce in 
motor vehicles. The purpose of these laws is to insure, among other things, that 
motor vehicle dealers ("dealers") will act responsibly, honestly and fairly towards 
their customers. These laws include: 
1. The Utah Motor Vehicle Act ("Motor Vehicle Act"). 
2. The Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act ("Sales Practices Act"), and 
3. The Utah Uniform Commercial Code ("Commercial Code"). 
The Motor Vehicle Act imposes upon each dealer the following 
requirements: (a) That the dealer be licensed (§ 41-3-201). (b) That the dealer be 
bonded, (§ 41-3-205) by the form of bond approved by the Utah Attorneys' 
General ("Dealer's Bond") (§ 41-3-205(1)(c)). (c) That the dealer fully, fairly and 
timely disclose to each purchaser all relevant facts concerning the physical 
condition and mileage of each vehicle a dealer sells. (§ 41-3-1310; Haynes v. 
Manning, 917 F.2d 450 452- 453 (10 Cir. 1990). (d) That a dealer fully, fairly and 
timely disclose to each purchaser all relevant facts concerning any financing 
arrangements relating to the sale of a motor vehicle (§ 41-3-401). (e) That a dealer 
deal honestly, fairly and in good faith with its customers (§ 41-3-210). And (f) 
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t commit any fraud or fraudulent representations or violate any other 
provisions "ii( I(I r M ^ '#.*lipi. |i \i i < i in y I u, i ilV or regulation respecting 
commerce in motor vehicles (§ 41-3-404(1)(a)). 
The provisions of the motor vehicle Act are further strengthened by 
application of the provisions of (a) the Utah Administrative Code that interprets 
and underpins s- Vehicle Act's provisions, (b) The express terms 
of the Dealer Bonds, and (c) the linns I Ihr pailies1 wnllni . <uilracts which are 
required by the Motor Vehicle Act to disclose certain specified informal >* 
3-4U "he provisions of the Motor Vehicle Act are to be construed broadly to 
person, such as the plaintiffs, who do business with motor vehicle dealers. 
Western jiah 198 /OA-2-714. 
It is significant that the Motor Vehii lc A I impose, i uminal sanctions for 
its violation (§ 41-3-701), in addition to civil liability (§§ .11 \ VflTil in.! II 1 
404(1-)). 
Tlii N<ik\s Practices Act, which applies to transactions involving commerce 
in motor vehicles, Wilkim 
renders a dealer liable for deceptive or unconscionable
 (u'i,s ,1111 pnnli. \'s 
committed "knowingly or intentionally" or "with an intent to deceive" (§§ 
I he application, provisions and remedies afforded by 
(lie Sales Pntdices Ad <.tn in addition to remedies otherwise available for the same 
conduct under other •" > 
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The Commercial Code imposes upon all parties, particularly dealers, 
obligations of good faith and fair dealing (70A-1-203) as well as duties of being 
honest in fact (70A-1-103). The provisions, purposes and remedies provided 
under the Commercial Code are also to be liberally administered to the end that the 
aggrieved party be put in as good a position as if the other party had fully 
performed (§ 70A-1-106). 
The defendants admit to having committed multiple violations of the civil 
and criminal provisions of the Motor Vehicle Act. The Trial Court totally ignored 
the defendants civil and criminal violations, the defendants' violations of the Sales 
Practices Act and the duties imposed upon the defendants under the Commercial 
Code, the Sales Contract and the Dealer's Bond. The Trial Court's rulings were 
apparently premised upon the erroneous assumption and interpretation that the 
aforementioned facts and statutes constitute and support only dependent causes of 
action and not the independent causes of action the plaintiffs alleged in their 
Complaint based upon the aforementioned laws. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS' 
CLAIMS AND CAUSES OF ACTION WHERE THE 
DEFENDANTS ADMITTED COMMITTING MULTIPLE CIVIL 
AND CRIMINAL VIOLATIONS OF THE UTAH MOTOR 
VEHICLE ACT AND OTHER LAWS RESPECTING 
COMMERCE IN MOTOR VEHICLES. 
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In construing the Sales Practices Act, the Motor Vehicle Act, the 
Comme e 
remembered that these Acts and undertakings be construed with the stated purpose 
of keeping Utah law consistent with federal and sister states' consumer protection 
standards. In the absence of any language to the contrary, these Acts should be 
com lederal and sister states 
laws. U.C.A. §§ 13-11-2, 70A-1-102(2). 
A. Interpretation And Application Qf The Statwtes: 
These Acts, contracts and Dealer's Bonds are to be liberally and broadly 
construed, IJM .A. i?s i > i i 1% iiu\ n lOfi, Western Sur. Co, v Redding, 626 P.2d 
437 (Utah 1981) uroadly to protect persons 
doing business with motor vehicle dealers.) The intent .mil puiposv oi iliest mi, w s 
is to protect consumers and require suppliers to abandon use of deceptive and 
unconscionable practices. In the case of licensed and bonded motor vehicle 
ilr.ilm I li.Hi l-iw, yiu^ in/en luiiliei and imposes upon them the requirement that 
they post a bond of motor vehicle deak-i, ^ih MM.II mil < islici Tlio 1 Iraki llmitl 
herein states: 
" i f the above bounded principal. . . shall well and truly observe and 
comply with all requirements and provisions of THE ACT PROVIDING 
FOR THE REGULATION AND CONTROL OF THE BUSINESS OF 
DEALING IN MOTOR VEHICLES, as provided by Chapter 3, Title 41, 
Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended), and indemnify persons, firms and 
corporations in accordance with Chapter 3, Title 41, Utah Code Ann. (1953, 
as amended), for loss suffered by reason of the fraud or fraudulent 
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representations made or through the violation of any of the provisions of 
Chapter 3, Title 41, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended), or any law 
respecting commerce in motor vehicles or rule respecting commerce in 
motor vehicles promulgated by a licensing or regulating authority so that 
the total aggregate annual liability on the bond to all persons making claims 
may not exceed $20P000.00 . as set forth in Chapter 3, Title 41, Utah 
Code Ann. (1953, as amended) on account of fraud or fraudulent 
representations or for any violation or violations of said laws or rules 
during the time of said license and all renewals thereof, then the above 
obligation shall be null and void, otherwise to remain in full force and 
effect. Said bonded Principal shall also pay reasonable attorney's fees in 
cases successfully prosecuted or settled against the Surety or Principle if the 
bond has not been depleted" 
(Emphasis added) (R. 233 - 236, Addendum B). The Plaintiffs argued to the Trial 
Court that the defendants multiple admitted violations of both civil and criminal 
provisions of the Motor Vehicle Act constituted per se deceptive and 
unconscionable acts and practices. (R. 445, p. 22 -23.) The defendants' civil and 
criminal violations also breached the Commercial Code, the express and implied 
provisions of the Sales Contract, the warranties given by the defendants as well as 
the duties and conditions set forth in the defendants' Dealer Bond. 
The 1995 legislature amended the Sales Practices Act, § 13-11-4(2), by 
removing the requirement of "intent to deceive" and replacing it "knowingly or 
intentionally." This change brings the Sales Practices Act's imposition of liability 
into harmony with the standard federal courts impose for violations of the federal 
odometer act's requirements of "intent to defraud" found at 49 U.S.C. § 32710(a). 
By eliminating one's casual indifference to the truth of his representation, which is 
something less than a deliberate lie, the legislature has determined that the 
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appropf • ,Landard . I . .iiilii-l w I • div. lose nlial MIH knows Common sense 
and sound public policy support interpretatl< imposin e 
civil or criminal violation of the **uvs respecting commerce in motor vehicles 
constitutes not only deceptive acts per se but should also be deemed to constitute 
unconscionable acts per se as well. 
'• ' Tin < "itiitiiinn Mil Ctxlr's piuvision.s .mil multiple n Icioiures lo "^ood hilli/' 
(§§ 70A4402(3), 70A4-201(19), 70A4-203, 70A-2-103(l)(b)) demonstral< an 
unwavering duty that "honesty in fact" in ones, conduct and observance of 
reasonable and fair dealings be maintained. One's obligations of good faith, 
ilihgeno1 n\t\n - . . disclaimed or avoided. The 
Commercial Code • : . - made ill Ihe ."ales 
Practices Act. Utah has long recognized that a seller, whether he or she is a 
"merchant" (§ 70A-2404), a "supplier" {§ 1341-3(6)), a "dealer" (§ 414a-
102(13) .& 41-3-102(8)), or a layperson is presumed to know the material facts 
she sells, how^ mchelson, 225 P.2d 735 
(Utah 1951). A contract U\\ 'nilr iillmri II* IIIMH ihiin ihj'lil IIIIINI iniiiiipniiiiiir 
differences from those specified or described in the contract. Norrington v. 
Wright, 115 U.S. 188(1885). 
Legi, abandonment of the doctrine of caveat emptor is 
consistent with . 11n- Sales Pnnlin s \w jnnilii mi 
Commercial Code. U.C.A. § 70A-313(a) and (b) specifical = 
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"buyer beware" by making affirmations of fact and descriptions that become a part 
of the basis of the bargain or contract express warranties that the goods will 
conform with the affirmations or promises. The doctrine of caveat emptor is also 
incompatible with prevailing trends in consumer law, product's liability law, and 
the law of torts. Wade v. Jobe, 818 P.2d 1006,1010 (Utah 1991). 
Of particular concern to plaintiffs and their claims and causes of action are 
the defendants' admissions that they violated multiple provisions of the Motor 
Vehicle Act. The plaintiffs contend that the Motor Vehicle Act recognizes and 
provides them with independent causes of action for the defendants' breaches 
thereof. The alternative is that the Motor Vehicle Act's causes of action are 
dependant upon or derived from some other source, such as the administrative 
agency charged with the Act's enforcement. If the Motor Vehicle Act's causes of 
action are dependent, the Trial Court's decisions should be affirmed and the Motor 
Vehicle's Act's limitations set forth in a published decision. 
B. The Motor Vehicle Act: 
Other than one's home, the average consumer spends more of his hard 
earned income on motor vehicles than any other single purchase over the 
consumer's lifetime. Due to the serious and often dire financial consequence to 
consumers who purchase motor vehicles from dealers who then fail or refuse to 
honor their commitments, both state and federal laws have been enacted protecting 
consumers. The sale of new and used motor vehicle is heavily legislated, 
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in :»]! , ing hundreds I \u\i\vs ol ILiv mlr1 IIINJI nyuLili mis h, hotli linn1 Slali if 
Utah and the Federal govern 
Utah specifically defines the persons licensed and engaged in the business 
of buying, selling, repairing or replacing new and used motor vehicle parts or in 
restoring of vehicles to sound working condition. These statutes also define one's 
o 40), 
(46) and (50). §§41-3-102(8), (22), and (24) further define the conduct, activities, 
locations and persons subject to licensing and bonding when selling motor vehicles 
(§§ 41-3-201(1 & 2) 41-3-202(2), >-204(l)). The 
defendants violated these and numerous otftei I;M t 
in flint i« I % ri1iMiif\ tlrsplayin ! *n* :> 
plaintiffs from Clark's home. 
For example, it was illegal for Clark to personally advertise the subject 
vehicle, as his personal - family vehicle while the subject vehicle was licensed, 
titled, and incluui ilership* s used t»i m ins rnloi \ I' III '> ..' 11111) 1, 111 11«.. 
251 - 253.) It was illegal for Clark to advertise the subject vehicle as his personal 
- family vehicle without identifying the dealer as the seller or using the dealer's 
license number in the advertisement (§ 41-3-210(1)(b)). (R. 251 - 253x Tx w a s 
i l legal for the defendants to viola te the M o t o r Veh ic l e Ac t (§ 41 3 21 0(1 )(c)) It 
Vnis ill* ji."1 ill I mi lln IJII Illi 11 ill I ill in 1" I I vim illiilt1 slati' lliiiw in cs[)iu hnji i n i i i m r i i r in iiiinlor 
vehic les i rule respec t ing c o m m e r c e in m o t o r vehic les (§ 41-3-210(1) (d ) ) . It 
was illegal for the defendants to remanufacture, assemble or reconstruct the subject 
vehicle without meeting construction, safety standards (§§ 41-3-210(1)(1), 78-15-
6). It was illegal for the defendants to allow Clark to act as a salesperson by 
displaying, contacting prospective customers or promoting the sale of the 
dealership's vehicles (§ 41-3-210(1)(m)). And it was illegal for the defendants to 
display for sell, offer for sale or sell the subject vehicle from Clark's home (§§ 41-
3-210(l)(n); 41-3-102(22)). 
Contrary to the rulings of the two Trial Court judges that interpreted the 
Motor Vehicle Act as providing no independent cause of action or remedy to the 
plaintiffs, §§ 41-3-404 and 41-3-702(5) must be construed as providing 
independent and individual rights of action against dealers, salespersons and their 
surety bonds. In order for one to maintain a cause of action, one must suffer a loss 
or damage due to fraud, fraudulent misrepresentations, or a violation of the laws 
respecting commerce in motor vehicles (§ 41-3-404(1)). A Dealer Bond, issued on 
a form approved by the Attorneys' General office, obligates the dealer's surety to 
indemnify persons who suffer losses by reason of a dealer's misconduct under § 
41-3-404. When one suffers a loss, particularly a consumer, due to a dealer's 
fraud, fraudulent representations or violation of any law, rule or regulation 
respecting commerce in motor in motor vehicles, the consumer is protected by 
being able to recover from the dealer's surety Betenson v. Call Auto Equip. Sales 
Inc., 645 P.2d 684 (Utah 1982). 
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The legislature has given consumers additional protections by granting to 
those consumers who must pursue a remedy in court the right to recover the 
consumer's costs and attorneys fees as a matter of law (§§ 13-11-19(5), 41-3-
205(3) and 41-3-702 (4)(b)). The Dealer's Bond at issue in these proceedings 
expressly provides that the "Principal shall also pay reasonable attorneys' fees in 
cases successfully prosecuted or settled against the Surety or Principal if the bond 
has not been depleted." (R. 233 - 236.) 
The Motor Vehicle Act provides for both civil and criminal penalties for the 
defendants' admitted violations herein (§§ 41-3-701 and 41-3-702). The 
defendants' violation of § 41-3-702(1)(b)(ii) are evidenced by Clark's personal 
advertisement that he placed and paid for in order to sell the subject vehicle in 
violation of §§ 41-3-210(l)(a), (b), (m) and (n). The defendants' multiple 
admitted breaches of the Motor Vehicle Act demonstrate their omissions and 
tortuous misrepresentations that they made in order to induce the plaintiffs 
purchase of the subject vehicle. (R. 245. 366, 402 - 403.) The defendants' 
tortuous misrepresentations also induced the plaintiffs into believing they were 
dealing with a regular layperson who sought to sell his personal - family vehicle 
(R. 251 - 253.) It was not until after the plaintiffs' had agreed to purchase the 
subject vehicle that they learned that the subject vehicle was in fact being sold by a 
dealership and not Clark personally. (R. 370.) 
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The defendants' violations of § 41-3-702 (l)(b)(iv) were admitted when the 
defendants failed to insure that the subject vehicle, which was a total loss salvage 
motor vehicle, was remanufactured, assembled and reconstructed in compliance 
with the manufacturer's construction and safety standards. (R. 245, 402 - 403.) 
The defendants' gross negligence in not replacing or repairing the subject vehicle's 
crush zones, collapse zones, accident/ energy absorbing components and in not 
properly mounting the subject vehicle's seat belt mounts were contrary to §§ 41-3-
210(1)(1) and41-3-702(l)(b)(iv). (R. 245, 402-403.) 
The defendants violations of § 41-3-702(1) (c)(iv) were shown by the 
defendants' advertising, offering for sale, displaying and selling the subject vehicle 
from Clark's home in direct violation of §§ 41-3-210(1)(m) and (n) and 41-3-
102(22). (R. 251 - 253.) And the defendants violation of § 41-3-702(1)(c)(vii) was 
admitted by the defendants use of Clark as an unlicensed salesperson in connection 
with the sale of the subject vehicle which vehicle was part of the dealership's 
motor vehicle inventory. (R. 360.) The defendants' conduct is contrary to §§ 41-3-
201, 41-3-202(5), 41-3-208, and 41-3-210(m) and (n) and was undertaken and 
carried out for the obvious and apparent purpose of defrauding the State of Utah of 
tax revenue. Clark is the one who financed the acquisition, repairs and sale of the 
subject even though the subject vehicle was purchased, titled and repaired in the 
dealership's name, under the dealership's license and under the dealer's control. 
(R. 251 -253, 360.) 
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The civil penalty for violating § 41-3-702(1) is "not less than a $1,000.00, 
or treble the actual damages caused by the person, which ever is greater; and 
reasonable attorney's fees and costs of the action" (§ 41-3-702(4)). § 41-3-702(5) 
states that a "civil action may be maintained by a purchaser or the administrator." 
This section supplements and reinforces Plaintiffs claims that the Motor Vehicle 
Act authorizes independent causes of action contrary to the Trial Court's 
interpretation that the plaintiffs had no claim or cause of action under the law or 
facts cited and argued to the Trial Court (§§ 41-3-404 and 41-3-702(5)). 
Defendants' Dealer Bond reinforces plaintiffs' claims that their causes of 
action are independent and not dependent. The language of the Dealer Bond (R. 
233 - 236) states that the surety will indemnify persons, firms and corporations for 
losses suffered by reason fraud or fraudulent representations made or through 
violation of any law respecting commerce in motor vehicles. In addition to 
indemnifying persons who suffer losses as outlined above the surety agrees to pay 
the reasonable attorney's fees in cases successfully prosecuted or settled. The 
reality and practical effect of virtually every consumer related lawsuit is that the 
cost of litigating consumer claims often exceeds the value of the matters disputed. 
If it were not for the Sales Practices Act's (§ 13-11-19(5)) the Motor Vehicle Act's 
(§§ 41-3-205(3), 41-3-702(5)) the Dealer's Bond and the Commercial Code's 
recognition of consequential damages (§§ 70A-2-715 and 70A-2-719) and which 
provide for an award attorneys fees and costs, consumers simply could not afford 
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to pursue any claim. This would make the consumer protection provisions of Utah 
law illusory and of no value. 
The statutes providing for minimal damages (§§ 13-11-19(2), 41-3-702(4)), 
actual damages (§ 13-11-19(2)), or treble damages (§ 41-3-702(4)) in addition to 
costs and attorneys fees does not make litigating consumer protection matters 
worthwhile without assurances of compensation. The attorneys' fees and value of 
legal services required to protect consumers is a matter of public interest and 
therefore left to the court to decide. Legal time spent pursuing issues of fact and 
law that ultimately are not litigated or upon which a plaintiff does not prevail does 
not preclude such fees from being awarded. Fleet Investment Co. Inc. v.Rogers, 
620 F.2d 782 (10th Cir. 1980); Gurule v. Wilson, 635 F.2d 782 (10th Cir. 1980). 
The Motor Vehicle Act's requirement that there be a surety bond financially 
guarantees that judgments will be paid to the extent of the face amount of a bond. 
Betenson v. Call Auto Equip. Sales Inc., 645 P.2d 684 (Utah 1982). It is ironic in 
that in many instances the dealer bond is insufficient to fully compensate the 
victimized consumer even though the intent of the dealer's bond is to protect all 
persons doing business with those acting as a licensed motor vehicle dealer. 
Lawrence v. Ward, 5 Utah 2d 257, 300 P.2d 619 (1956); 
C. The Saks Practices Act: 
The Sales Practices Act imposes upon "suppliers" (§ 13-11-3(6)) the duty 
and legal requirement that they refrain from deceptive acts and practices. §13-11-
23 
4 lists some 14 different examples of acts or practices that the legislature has 
established as being deceptive. Consumers need and are afforded protection from 
deceptive and unconscionable acts committed by car dealers, such as the 
defendants, when buying cars. Woodhaven, 942 P.2d 924. Of concern to the 
plaintiffs' claims are Clark's personal guarantee that he had properly repaired the 
subject vehicle. It was only after the plaintiffs had been involved in a minor fender 
bender and the subject vehicle's outer skin was removed that the falsity of Clark's 
performance characteristics were made known (§ 13-11-4(a)). 
Clark's personal guarantee and assurances that the subject vehicle had been 
properly repaired and was safe for use as plaintiffs family car (§ 70A-2-313) and 
particular purposes (§ 70A-2-314), claiming he had used the subject vehicle 
himself for such uses himself, were knowing and intentional misrepresentations 
concerning the subject vehicle. (R. 370.) The defendants' knew that the repairs 
they had caused to be made were inadequate, incomplete, unsafe and 
unprofessional in that they hide and concealed their shoddy repairs under the 
subject vehicle's outer skin, interior furnishings and floor coverings. (R. 201, 254, 
402 - 403.) Clark's misrepresented the subject vehicle's quality, grade and the 
fact that the subject vehicle met a particular standard when it did not (§ 13-11-
4(b)). (R. 370.) The defendants knowingly and intentionally misrepresented the 
extent of the subject vehicle's prior damage and repairs. These were materially 
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facts concerning the subject vehicle's use and the extent to which it had previously 
been damaged in violation of § 13-11-4(c), 
The defendants' representations (R. 370) that the subject vehicle had been 
properly and professionally repaired, when it had not, and was fit for the plaintiffs 
intended use and particular purpose, when it was not, breached § 13-11-4(e). A 
dealer or its agent violates the consumer protection statutes, which impose no 
requirement of evil intent or actual knowledge, when the dealer or agent represents 
to the consumer that a defacto damaged and incompletely repaired motor vehicle 
has been properly repaired when it has not. Bell v. Kent-Brown Chevrolet Co., 561 
P.2d 907 (Kan App. 1972). A dealer who was on notice of the true facts about a 
motor vehicle but who did not report them accurately to its buyer was held to have 
violated a consumer practices act in Brandywine Volkswagen, Ltd. v. State Dept. of 
Comm. Affairs, 312 A.2d 632 (Del Sup. 1973). 
The facts of this case are even more compelling given the defendants 
knowledge that the subject vehicle was a total loss salvage and required extensive 
repairs that the defendants personally undertook to perform. The defendants' 
failure or refusal to spend the money sufficient to replace or repair the subject 
vehicle's damaged crush and collapse zones or seat belt mounting brackets was 
negligent, tortuous, unconscionable and illegal. The defendants hiding their 
incomplete, unsafe and shoddy repairs under the subject vehicle's outer skin, 
interior furnishing and floor coverings were intentional acts, tortuous acts, 
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unconscionable act and acts that violated the aforementioned provisions of the 
Motor Vehicle Act and Sale Practices Act. (§§ 13-11-4 and 41-3-210.) The 
defendants failure to state the true status of the subject vehicle, while 
misrepresenting it condition and concealing the facts which would render the 
subject vehicle unacceptable or substantially less desirable to the plaintiffs was 
negligent, tortuous, seriously lacking in good faith and a cardinal breach of the 
applicable acts. Testo v. Russ Dunmire Oldsmobile, Inc., 554 P.2d 394 (Wash. 
1976). 
The defendants' use of a preprinted federal Buyers Guide in an attempt to 
disclaim all of Clark's personal guarantees is inconsistent with the Commercial 
Code's imposition of warranties as found in §§ 13-ll-4(j), 70A-2-313(a) and (b), 
70A-2-314 and 70A-2-315. In addition to the laundry list set forth in § 13-11-4, § 
13-11-5, allow the court to independently consider whether or not a supplier's acts 
or practices are unconscionable. As presented above in the Argument Summary, it 
was and is plaintiffs' position that the defendants' civil or criminal violation of the 
laws respecting commerce in motor vehicles constituted per se deceptive acts and 
practices as well as being per se unconscionable. Plaintiffs' argument was 
presented to both of the trial judges but wsa rejected in both instances out of hand. 
(R. 287-291,423-425.) 
D. The Commercial Code: 
26 
The defendants breached their duties of good faith, honesty in fact, 
diligence, reasonableness, care, due diligence, duty to supply goods that 
conformed to the contract, and engaged in deceptive and unconscionable conduct 
in performing their obligations under their contract with plaintiffs. The 
Commercial Code exacts higher and more exact standards from those individuals 
"who deal in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as 
having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the 
transaction..." (§ 70A-2-104(l). § 70A-2-313(l) and (2) outline the creation of 
express warranties by recognizing that "any affirmation of fact or promise made by 
the seller to the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes a part of the basis of 
the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform." Subsection 
(2) recognizes that it "is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that 
the seller use formal words such as 'warrant' or 'guarantee' or that he have a 
specific intent to make a warranty...." 
Clark's affirmations and representations that he had repaired the subject 
vehicle, and the fact that the subject vehicle was sold by and through a dealership, 
establishes the requisite skill and peculiar knowledge sufficient to make the 
defendants "merchants" under the Commercial Code. The defendants' 
pronouncement and portrayal were a description of the goods that were made a 
basis of the bargain and created a warranty if their natural tendency was to induce 
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a buyer to purchase and the buyer thus induced did purchase. Nielson v. 
Hermansen, 166 P.2d 536 (Utah 1946). 
Even though Nielson predates the Commercial Code, the Commercial Code 
nevertheless adopts Nielson as the appropriate commercial standard. Additionally, 
where the sellers/defendants made certain representations that induced and 
culminated in a sale, both Utah statutes and decisional law make the sellers jointly 
responsible for their representations. A positive affirmation of fact that tends to 
induce a bargain is a warranty and the fact that the seller did not intend to warrant 
is no defense. Park v. Moorman Mtg. Co., 241 P.2d 914, 917 (Utah 1952); 
Studebaker v. Bros. Co. v. Anderson 167 Pac. 663 (Utah 1917). 
Oral representations of fact are recognized in other jurisdictions as 
warranties as well and not as "mere puffing." See Chrysler - Plymouth City Inc. v. 
Guerrero, 620 SW 2d 700 (Tex Civ. App. 4th Dist 1981). InHackett v. Lewis, 173 
Pac. I l l (Cal. App. 1918), the court held that the simple principle is that any 
distinct assertion of quality or character made by the seller and intended to be 
relied upon to induce a purchase is a warranty. Even a representation made after a 
sale, to promote the sale by inviting reliance respecting the goods may be 
actionable as express warranties. Downie v. Abex Corp., 741 F.2d 1235 (10th Cir. 
1984). Defendants' refusal to inform plaintiffs of the true status of the subject 
vehicle's unsafe and incomplete repairs and flat refusal to honor Clark's personal 
guarantees, which were defacto terms of the Sales Contract (R. 196 -197), 
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breached the express warranties that induced plaintiffs purchase of the subject 
vehicle. 
Whether an affirmation of fact, a promise, or a description of the goods is a 
warranty is determined by what a reasonable person would have taken from the 
statement. State of Utah, By Div. of Consumer Protection v. GAFF Corp.. 760 
P.2d 310 (Utah 1988). An express warranty is created when a reasonable person 
would have entered into the transaction based on the particular statement. Id., 3 R. 
Anderson, Anderson on the Uniform Commercial Code § 2-313:50 at 40 (3d Id. 
1983). Actual reliance need not be shown, as in this case, only that the statement 
formed a "part of the bargain." § 70A-2-313, Jensen v. Seigel Mobil Homes 
Group, 668 P.2d 65, 71 (Idaho 1983), Autzen v. John C. Taylor Lumber Sales, 572 
P.2d 1322,1324-25 (Oregon 1977). 
Both Trial Court judges erred in dismissing plaintiffs claims under the 
Commercial Code for the defendants breach of express warranty. Whether or not 
the plaintiffs acted as reasonable people when they relied upon Clark's personal 
guarantee was a question for the jury to decide, not the Trial Court judges. The 
defendants persuaded the Trial Court that only the written contract and related 
documents should be considered and that Clark's representations and promises had 
no effect. Defendants' arguments are contrary to Utah law (§ 70A-2-313) and the 
Official Comment No. 9 to § 70A-2-513 concerning a "Buyer's Right to inspection 
of Goods:" 
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Inspection' under this section has to do with the buyer's check-up on 
whether the seller's performance is in accordance with a contract previously 
made and is not to be confused with 'examination' of the goods or a sample 
or model of them at the time of contracting which may affect the warranties 
involved in the Contract. 
It is simply bad law to insist that once a buyer buys, it is assumed that she 
knew what she was buying. Baker v. Latser, 206 Pac. 553 (Utah 1922); Official 
Comment No. 9 to § 2-215. Utah has long recognized that a party may justifiably 
rely on positive assertions of fact without an independent investigation. Conder v. 
Williams 739 P.2d 634, 638 (Utah App. 1987). Today's motor vehicles are 
sophisticated and complex. They are also difficult and expensive to maintain and 
in many instances require a particular expertise, special education and specialized 
tools to properly inspect, diagnose, maintain, or repair or them. It is contrary to 
the authority cited herein to hold that a buyer is presumed to know what she 
bought. The Trial Court's interpretation of the Commercial Code appears to have 
mixed and confused the rules applicable to sales of real property with the rules of 
law that apply to the sale of goods. 
As pointed out to both judges of the Trial Court §§ 70A-2-314 and 70A-2-
315 impose duties of merchantability and fitness upon the defendants. For goods 
to be merchantability they must at least "pass without objection in the trade . . . [or 
be] fit for the ordinary purpose for which such goods are used . . . " The 
undisputed testimony of the Utah Motor Vehicle enforcement Inspector and the 
auto body professional who initially identified the unsafe, incomplete, dangerous, 
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shoddy and unprofessional repairs were that the repairs the defendants caused to be 
performed on the subject vehicle would not have passed in the trade and made the 
subject vehicle unfit for it ordinary purpose. (R. 245, 402 - 403.) 
The defendants multiple admitted breaches of the express contract terms 
and warranties are unconscionable under § 70A-2-302. The Commercial Code's 
nonwaivable, inescapable duties were ignored by the defendants who had more 
knowledge than anyone concerning the subject vehicle. As merchants dealing with 
lay customers they did not have the right or privilege to use their superior 
knowledge and skill to hide the material facts concerning the ownership, 
incomplete repairs, dangerous and unsafe condition the subject vehicle was in 
when they sold it to plaintiffs. Such conduct is unconscionable and ridiculous in 
the extreme. 
Defendants' unconscionable conduct and flat but refusal to honor their 
express warranties precludes them from limiting the effect of their 
misrepresentation and warranties. Schurtz v. BMW of North America, Inc., 814 
P.2d 1108 (Utah 1991). Under Schurtz, a disparity in a consumer's bargaining 
power defeats a seller's attempts to limit its warranty liability through the use of 
preprinted documents that restrict the consumer's remedies. The consumer is 
entitled to seek incidental and consequential damages because it would be 
unconscionable to enforce disclaimer clauses in transaction documents which 
purport to deny any and all remedies otherwise available to the consumer. 
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Unconscionability results from the inequality of the sellers extracting from the 
buyer a payment for goods that were not delivered, that the buyer cannot use or 
fully use. Irving Leasing Corp. v. M & H Tire Co., 475 NE 2d 127 (Ohio App. 
1984) and cases cited in Annot Unconscionability Under UCC § 2-302 or 2-
719(3) of Disclaimer of Warranties or Limitations or Exclusions of Damages in 
Contract Subject to UCC Article 2 (Sales) 38 ALR 4th 25. 
CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court, notwithstanding the defendants' admitted multiple 
violations of the provisions of the Sales Practices Act, the Motor Vehicle Act, and 
the Commercial Code, granted the defendants summary judgment with respect to 
all of plaintiffs' claims based upon such violations. The defendants violated these 
provisions knowingly and intentionally thereby enabling them to induce the 
plaintiffs' to purchase the subject vehicle at a significantly inflated purchase price 
and in a serious and unsafe condition. The safeguards intended by the legislature to 
preclude the kind of conduct in which the defendants' engaged in their dealings 
with the plaintiffs were thus subverted and rendered wholly ineffective. 
This Court should rule: (A) That the defendants had a positive non-
abandonable legal duty to know the physical condition of the subject vehicle at the 
time it was sold by them to the plaintiff's and to honestly, fully, fairly and timely 
advise plaintiffs of all relevant facts concerning such condition. (B) That the 
plaintiffs are entitled to pursue each and all of the rights and remedies which are 
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expressly afforded them by the Sales Practices Act, the Motor Vehicle Act, the 
Commercial Code, the Utah Administrative Code, the Dealer's Bond and the Sales 
Contract. (C) That the Trial Court's award of costs was in error and (d) that the 
aforementioned Acts are to be construed liberally and broadly in plaintiffs' favor 
to insure that the rights and remedies for the plaintiffs as members of the 
consuming public are safe guarded and rendered effective and meaningful. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED t h i s / ^ day of December, 1998. 
Ray G. Martineau 
Anthony R. Martineau 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
Certificate of Service 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Appellant's 
Brief was served upon the following individual by mailing a copy thereof, postage 
prepaid, to said individual at the following address this /?*- jay of December, 
1998. 
T. Richard Davis 
CALLISTER NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH 
900 Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84133 
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ADDENDUM A 
STATUTES DETERMINATIVE AND OF CENTRAL 
IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL: 
Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act: 
13-11-2. Construction and purposes of act. 
This act shall be construed liberally to promote the following policies: 
(1) to simplify, clarify, and modernize the law governing consumer 
sales practices; 
(2) to protect consumers from suppliers who commit deceptive and 
unconscionable sales practices; 
(3) to encourage the development of fair consumer sales practices; 
(4) to make state regulation of consumer sales practices not 
inconsistent with the policies of the Federal Trade Commission Act relating 
to consumer protection; 
(5) to make uniform the law, including the administrative rules, with 
respect to the subject of this act among those states which enact similar 
laws; and 
(6) to recognize and protect suppliers who in good faith comply 
with the provisions of this act. 
13-11-3. Definitions. 
(2) "Consumer transaction" means a sale, lease, assignment, award by 
chance, or other written or oral transfer or disposition of goods, services, or 
other property, both tangible and intangible (except securities and 
insurance), to a person for primarily personal, family, or household 
purposes, or for purposes that relate to a business opportunity that requires 
both his expenditure of money or property and his personal services on a 
continuing basis and in which he has not been previously engaged, or a 
solicitation or offer by a supplier with respect to any of these transfers or 
dispositions. It includes any offer or solicitation, any agreement, any 
performance of an agreement with respect to any of these transfers or 
dispositions, and any charitable solicitation as defined in this section. 
(6) "Supplier" means a seller, lessor, assignor, offeror, broker, or 
other person who regularly solicits, engages in, or enforces consumer 
transactions, whether or not he deals directly with the consumer. 
13-11-4. Deceptive act or practice by supplier. 
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(1) A deceptive act or practice by a supplier in connection with a consumer 
transaction violates this chapter whether it occurs before, during, or after the 
transaction. 
(2) Without limiting the scope of Subsection (1), a supplier commits a 
deceptive act or practice if the supplier knowingly or intentionally: 
(a) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction has sponsorship, 
approval, performance characteristics, accessories, uses, or benefits, if it 
has not; 
(b) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction is of a particular 
standard, quality, grade, style, or model, if it is not; 
(c) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction is new, or unused, 
if it is not, or has been used to an extent that is materially different from the 
fact; 
(j) indicates that a consumer transaction involves or does not involve a 
warranty, a disclaimer of warranties, particular warranty terms, or other 
rights, remedies, or obligations, if the representation is false; 
13-11-5. Unconscionable act or practice by supplier. 
(1) An unconscionable act or practice by a supplier in connection with a 
consumer transaction violates this act whether it occurs before, during, or after the 
transaction. 
(2) The unconscionability of an act or practice is a question of law for the 
court. If it is claimed or appears to the court that an act or practice may be 
unconscionable, the parties shall be given a reasonable opportunity to present 
evidence as to its setting, purpose, and effect to aid the court in making its 
determination. 
(3) In determining whether an act or practice is unconscionable, the court 
shall consider circumstances which the supplier knew or had reason to know. 
13-11-19. Actions by consumer. 
(1) Whether he seeks or is entitled to damages or otherwise has an 
adequate remedy at law, a consumer may bring an action to: 
(a) obtain a declaratory judgment that an act or practice violates this 
chapter; and 
(b) enjoin, in accordance with the principles of equity, a supplier who has 
violated, is violating, or is likely to violate this chapter. 
(2) A consumer who suffers loss as a result of a violation of this chapter 
may recover, but not in a class action, actual damage or $2,000, whichever is 
greater, plus court costs. 
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(5) Except for services performed by the enforcing authority, the court may 
award to the prevailing party a reasonable attorney's fee limited to the work 
reasonably performed if: 
(a) the consumer complaining of the act or practice that violates this 
chapter has brought or maintained an action he knew to be groundless; or a 
supplier has committed an act or practice that violates this chapter; and 
(b) an action under this section has been terminated by a judgment or 
required by the court to be settled under Subsection 13-ll-21(l)(a). 
13-11-23. Other remedies available—Class action only as prescribed by 
act. 
The remedies of this act are in addition to remedies otherwise available for 
the same conduct under state or local law, except that a class action relating to a 
transaction governed by this act may be brought only as prescribed by this act. 
Utah Motor Vehicle Dealer Act: 
41-la-102. Definitions. 
(13) "Dealer" means a person engaged or licensed to engage in the 
business of buying, selling, or exchanging new or used vehicles, vessels, or 
outboard motors either outright or on conditional sale, bailment, lease, chattel 
mortgage, or otherwise or who has an established place of business for the sale, 
lease, trade, or display of vehicles, vessels, or outboard motors. 
(33) (a) "Motor vehicle" means a self propelled vehicle intended 
primarily for use and operation on the highways. 
(b) "Motor vehicle" does not include an off-highway vehicle. 
(40) (a) "Owner" means a person, other than a lienholder, holding title 
to a vehicle, vessel, or outboard motor whether or not the vehicle, 
vessel, or outboard motor is subject to a security interest. 
(b) If a vehicle is the subject of an agreement for the conditional 
sale or installment sale or mortgage of the vehicle with the right of 
purchase upon performance of the conditions stated in the agreement 
and with an immediate right of possession vested in the conditional 
vendee or mortgagor, or if the vehicle is the subject of a security 
agreement, then the conditional vendee, mortgagor, or debtor is 
considered the owner for the purposes of this chapter. 
(c) If a vehicle is the subject of an agreement to lease, the lessor is 
considered the owner until the lessee exercises his option to purchase 
the vehicle. 
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(46) "Reconstructed vehicle" means every vehicle of a type required to 
be registered in this state that is materially altered from its original construction 
by the removal, addition, or substitution of essential parts, new or used. 
(50) "Repair or replacement" means the restoration of vehicles, vessels, 
or outboard motors to a sound working condition by substituting any 
inoperative part of the vehicle, vessel, or outboard motor, or by correcting the 
inoperative part. 
(66) "Vehicle" includes a motor vehicle, trailer, semitrailer, off-
highway vehicle, manufactured home, and mobile home. 
41-3-102. Definitions. 
(22) "Principal place of business" means a site or location in this state: 
(a) devoted exclusively to the business for which the dealer, 
manufacturer, remanufacturer, transporter, dismantler, crusher, or 
bond shop is licensed, and businesses incidental to them; 
(b) Sufficiently bounded by fence, chain, posts, or otherwise 
marked to definitely indicate the boundary and to admit a definite 
description with space adequate to permit the display of three or more 
new, or new and used, or used motor vehicles; and 
(c) that includes a permanent enclosed building or structure large 
enough to accommodate the office of the establishment and to provide 
a safe place to keep the books and other records of the business, at 
which the principal portion of the business is conducted and the books 
and records kept and maintained. 
(24) "Salesperson" means an individual who for a salary, commission, 
or compensation of any kind, is employed either directly, indirectly, regularly, 
or occasionally by any new motor vehicle dealer or used motor vehicle dealer 
to sell, purchase, or exchange or to negotiate for the sale, purchase, or 
exchange of motor vehicles. 
41-3-201. Licenses required. 
(1) A person may not act as nay of the following without having procured 
a license issued by the administrator: a dealer, salesperson, manufacturer, 
transporter, dismantler, distributor, factory branch and representative, distributor 
branch and representative, crusher, remanufacturer, and body shop. 
(2) A supplemental license shall be secured by a dealer, manufacturer, 
remanufacturer, transporter, dismantler, crusher, or body shop for each additional 
place of business maintained by him. 
41-3-202. Licenses — Classes and scope. 
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(1) A new motor vehicle dealer's license permits the licensee to: 
(a) offer for sale, sell, or exchange new motor vehicles if the licensee 
possesses a franchise from the manufacturer of the motor vehicle offered 
for sale, sold, or exchanged by the licensee; 
(b) offer for sale, sell, or exchange used motor vehicles; 
(c) operate as a body shop; and 
(d) dismantle motor vehicles. 
(2) A used motor vehicle dealer's license permits the licensee to: 
(a) offer for sale, sell, or exchange used motor vehicles; 
(b) operate as a body shop; and 
(c) dismantle motor vehicles. 
(3) A new motorcycle and shall trailer dealer's license permits the licensee 
to: 
(a) offer for sale, sell, or exchange new motorcycles or small trailers 
if the licensee possesses a franchise from the manufacturer or the 
motorcycle or small trailer offered for sale, sold, or exchanged by the 
licensee; 
(b) offer for sale, sell, or exchange used motorcycles or small trailers; 
and 
(c) dismantle motorcycles or small trailers. 
(4) A used motorcycle and small trailer dealer's license permits the 
licensee to: 
(a) offer for sale, sell, or exchange used motorcycles and small 
trailers; and 
(b) dismantle motorcycles or small trailers. 
(5) A salesperson's license permits the licensee to act as a motor vehicle 
salesperson and is valid for employment with only one dealer at a time. 
(6) (a) A manufacturer's license permits the licensee to construct or 
assemble motor vehicles subject to registration under Title 41, Chapter 
la, Motor Vehicle Act, at an established place of business and to 
remanuf acture motor vehicle. 
(b) Under rules of the division of licensee may issue and install 
vehicle identification numbers on manufactured motor vehicles. 
(7) A transporter's license permits the licensee to transport or deliver 
motor vehicles subject to registration under Title 41, Chapter la, Motor Vehicle 
Act from a manufacturing, assembling, or distributing point or from a dealer, to 
dealers, distributors, or sales agents of a manufacturer or remanufacturer, to or 
from detail or repair shops, and to financial institutions or places of storage from 
points of repossession. 
(8) A dismantler's license permits the licensee to dismantle motor vehicles 
subject to registration under Title 41, Chapter la, Motor Vehicle Act, for the 
purpose of reselling parts or for salvage, or selling dismantled or salvage vehicles 
to a crusher or other dismantler. 
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(9) A distributor or factory branch and distributor branch's license permits 
the licensee to sell and distribute new motor vehicles, parts, and accessories. 
(11) (a) (i) A remanufacturer's license permits the licensee to construct, 
reconstruct, assemble, or reassemble motor vehicles subject to 
registration under Title 41, Chapter la, Motor Vehicle Act, from 
used or new motor vehicles or parts. 
(ii) Evidence of ownership of parts and motor vehicles used in 
remanufacturer shall be available to the division upon demand, 
(b) Under rules of the administrator, the licensee may issue and 
install vehicle identification numbers on remanufactured motor vehicles. 
(12) A crusher's license permits the licensee to engage in the business of 
crushing or shredding motor vehicles subject to registration under Title 41, 
Chapter la, Motor Vehicle Act, for the purpose of reducing the useable materials 
and metals to a more compact size of recycling. 
(13) A body shop's license merits the licensee to rebuild, restore, repair, or 
paint primarily the body of motor vehicles damaged by collision or natural 
disaster, and to dismantle motor vehicles. 
(14) A special equipment dealer's license permits the licensee to: 
(a) buy incomplete new motor vehicles with a gross vehicle weight 
of 12,000 or more pounds from a new motor vehicle dealer and sell the 
new vehicle with the special equipment installed without a franchise from 
the manufacturer; 
(b) offer for sale, sell, or exchange used motor vehicles; 
(c) operate as a body shop; and 
(d) dismantle motor vehicles. 
41-3-205. Licenses—Bonds required—Maximum liability—Action against 
surety— 
(1) (a) Before a dealer's, special equipment dealer's, crusher's, or body 
shop's license is issued the applicant shall file with the administrator a 
corporate surety bond in the amount of: 
(i) $20,000 for a motor vehicle dealer's license or special 
equipment dealer's license; 
(b) The corporate surety shall be licensed to do business within the 
state. 
(c) The form of the bond: 
(i) shall be approved by the attorney general; 
(ii) shall be conditioned upon the applicant's conducting business 
as a dealer without fraud or fraudulent representation and without 
violating this chapter; and 
(iii) may be continuous in form. 
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(d) The total aggregate annual liability on the bond to all persons 
making claims may not exceed the amount of the bond. 
(2) A cause of action under Subsection (1) may not be maintained 
against a surety unless: 
(a) a claim is filed in writing with the administrator within one year 
after the cause of action arose; and 
(b) the action is commenced within two years after the claim was 
filed with the administrator. 
(3) A person making a claim on the bond shall be awarded attorneys' fees 
in cases successfully prosecuted or settled against the surety or principal if the 
bond has not been depleted. 
41-3-208. Salesperson's license — Relinquishment upon loss or change of 
employment — Notice to salesperson — New license required. 
(1) If a sales person is discharged from or leaves his employer, the dealer 
who last employed the salesperson shall return the salesperson's license to the 
administrator. 
(2) The salesperson shall be notified at his last known place of residence 
that his license has been returned to the administrator. 
(3) A person may not act as a motor vehicle salesperson until a new license 
is procured. 
41-3-210. License holders—Prohibitions. 
(1) The holder of any license issued under this chapter may not: 
(a) intentionally publish, display, or circulate any advertising that 
is misleading or inaccurate in any material fact or that misrepresents any 
of the products sold, manufactured, remanufactured, handled, or 
furnished by a licensee; 
(b) intentionally publish, displace, or circulate any advertising 
without identifying the seller as the licensee by including in the 
advertisement the full name under which the licensee is licensed or the 
licensee's number assigned by the division; 
(c) violate this chapter or the rules made by the administrator; 
(d) violate any law of the state respecting commerce in motor 
vehicles of any rule respecting commerce in motor vehicles made by 
any licensing or regulating authority of the state. 
(1) as a manufacturer or remanufacturer assemble a motor vehicle 
that does not comply with construction, safety, or vehicle identification 
number standards fixed by law or rule of any licensing or regulating 
authority; 
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(m) as anyone other than a salesperson licensed under this chapter, 
be present on a dealer display space and contact prospective customers 
to promote the sale of the dealer's vehicles; 
(n) sell, displace for sale, or offer for sale motor vehicles at any 
location other than the principal place of business or additional places of 
business licensed under this chapter; this provision is construed to 
prevent dealers, salespersons, or any other representative of a dealership 
from selling, displaying, or offering motor vehicles for sale from their 
homes or other unlicensed locations. 
41-3-404. Right of action against dealer, salesperson, crusher, body shop, or 
surety on bond. 
(1) A person may maintain an action against a dealer, crusher, or body ship 
on the corporate surety bond if: 
(a) the person suffers a loss or damage because of: 
(i) fraud; 
(ii) fraudulent representation; or 
(iii) a violation of: 
(A) this chapter; 
(B) any law respecting commerce in motor vehicles; or 
(C) a rule respecting commerce in motor vehicle made by a 
licensing or regulating authority; and 
(b) the loss or damage results from the action of: 
(i) a licensed dealer; 
(ii) a licensed dealer's salesperson action on behalf of the dealer or 
within the scope of the salesperson's employment; 
(iii) a licensed crusher; or 
(iv) a body shop. 
(2) Successive recovery against a surety on a bond is permitted, but the 
total aggregate annual liability on the bond to all persons making claims may not 
exceed the amount of the bond. 
(3) A cause of action may not be maintained against any surety under any 
bond required under this chapter except as provided in Section 41-3-205. 
41-3-701. Violations as misdemeanors. 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter any person who violates 
this chapter or any rule made by the administrator is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor. 
(2) A person who violates Section 41-3-201 is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor. 
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(3) A person who violates Section 41-3-301 is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor unless the selling dealer complies with the requirements of Section 
41-3-403. 
41-3-702. Civil penalty for violation. 
(1) The following are civil violations under this chapter and are in addition 
to criminal violations under this chapter: 
(b) Level II: 
(ii) advertising violation; 
(iv) manufacturing without meeting construction or vehicle 
identification number standards; and 
(c) Level III: 
(iv) selling from an unlicensed location; 
(vii) assisting an unlicensed dealer or salesperson in sales of motor 
vehicles. 
(3) The following are civil violations in addition to criminal violations 
under Section 41-la-1008: 
(a) knowingly selling a salvage vehicle, as defined in Section 41-1 a-
1001, without disclosing that the salvage vehicle has been repaired or 
rebuilt; 
(b) knowingly making a false statement on a vehicle damage disclosure 
statement, as defiled in Section 41-la-1001; or 
(c) fraudulently certifying that a damaged motor vehicle is entitled to 
an unbranded title, as defined in Section 41-la-1001, when it is not. 
(4) The civil penalty for a violation under Subsection (1) is: 
(a) not less than $1,000, or treble the actual damages caused by the 
person, whichever is greater; and 
(b) reasonable attorneys' fees and costs of the action. 
(5) A civil action may be maintained by a purchaser or by the 
administrator. 
Utah Uniform Commercial Code: 
70A-1-102. Purposes—Rules of construction—Variation by agreement. 
(1) This act shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its 
underlying purposes and policies. 
(2) Underlying purposes and policies of this act are 
(a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial 
transactions; 
(b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through 
custom, usage and agreement of the parties; 
(c) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions. 
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(3) The effect of provisions of this act may be varied by agreement, except 
as otherwise provided in this act and except that the obligations of good faith, 
diligence, reasonableness and care prescribed by this act may not be disclaimed by 
agreement but the parties may by agreement determine the standards by which the 
performance of such obligations is to be measured if such standards are not 
manifestly unreasonable. 
70A-1-103. Supplementary general principles of law applicable. 
Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this act, the principles of 
law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to capacity to 
contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, 
mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating or invalidating cause shall supplement its 
provisions. 
70A-1-106. Remedies to be liberally administered. 
(1) The remedies provided by this act shall be liberally administered to the 
end that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the other party 
had fully performed but neither consequential or special nor penal damages may 
be had except as specifically provided in this act or by other rule of law. 
(2) Any right or obligation declared by this act is enforceable by action 
unless the provision declaring it specifies a different and limited effect. 
70A-1-201. General definitions. 
(3) "Agreement" means the bargain of the parties in fact as found in 
their language or by implication from other circumstances including course 
of dealing or usage of trade or course of performance as provided in 
Sections 70A-1-205 and 70A-2-208. Whether an agreement has legal 
consequences is determined by the provisions of this title, if applicable; 
otherwise by the law of contracts as provided in Section 70A-1-103. 
Compare the definition of "contract" in Subsection (11). 
(11) "Contract" means the total legal obligation which results from 
the parties' agreement as affected by this title and any other applicable rules 
of law. Compare the definition of "agreement" in Subsection (3). 
(19) "Good faith" means honesty in fact in the conduct or 
transaction concerned. 
(25) (a) A person has "notice" of a fact when: 
(i) he has actual knowledge of it; 
(ii) he has received a notice or notification of it; or 
(iii) from all the facts and circumstances known to him at 
the time in question he has reason to know that it exists. 
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(b) A person "knows" or has "knowledge" of a fact when he 
has actual knowledge of it. 
(c) "Discover" or "learn" or a word or phrase of similar import 
refers to knowledge rather than to reason to know. 
(d) The time and circumstances under which a notice or 
notification may cease to be effective are not determined by this title. 
(27) Notice, knowledge of a notice, or notification received by an 
organization is effective for a particular transaction from the time when it is 
brought to the attention of the individual conducting that transaction, and in 
any event from the time when it would have been brought to his attention if 
the organization had exercised due diligence. An organization exercises 
due diligence if it maintains reasonable routines for communicating 
significant information to the person conducting the transaction and there is 
reasonable compliance with the routines. Due diligence does not require an 
individual acting for the organization to communicate information unless 
such communication is part of his regular duties or unless he has reason to 
know of the transaction and that the transaction would be materially 
affected by the information. 
70A-1-203. Obligation of good faith. 
Every contract or duty within this act imposes an obligation of good faith in 
its performance or enforcement. 
70A-1 -205. Course of dealing and usage of trade. 
(1) A course of dealing is a sequence of previous conduct between the 
parties to a particular transaction which is fairly to be regarded as establishing a 
common basis of understanding for interpreting their expressions and other 
conduct. 
70A-2-102. Scope—Certain security and other transactions excluded from 
this chapter. 
Unless the context otherwise requires, this chapter applies to transactions in 
goods; it does not apply to any transaction which although in the form of an 
unconditional contract to sell or present sale is intended to operate only as a 
security transaction nor does this chapter impair or repeal any statute regulating 
sales to consumers, farmers or other specified classes of buyers. 
70A-2-103. Definitions and index of definitions. 
(1) In this chapter unless the context otherwise requires 
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(a) "Buyer" means a person who buys or contracts to buy goods. 
(b) "Good faith" in the case of a merchant means honesty in fact and 
the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the 
trade. 
(d) "Seller" means a person who sells or contracts to sell goods. 
70A-2-104. Definitions—"Merchant" 
(1) "Merchant" means a person who deals in goods of the kind or 
otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill 
peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction or to whom such 
knowledge or skill may be attributed by his employment of an agent or broker or 
other intermediary who by his occupation holds himself out as having such 
knowledge or skill. 
70A-2-105. Definitions—"Goods" 
(1) "Goods" means all things (including specially manufactured goods) 
which are movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale other than 
the money in which the price is to be paid, investment securities (chapter 8) and 
things in action. 
70A-2-106. Definitions—"Contract"—"Agreement"—"Contract for sale"— 
"Sale"—"Present sale"—"Conforming" to contract— 
(1) In this chapter unless the context otherwise requires "contract" and 
"agreement" are limited to those relating to the present or future sale of goods. 
"Contract for sale" includes both a present sale of goods and a contract to sell 
goods at a future time. A "sale" consists in the passing of title from the seller to 
the buyer for a price (Section 70A-2-401). A "present sale" means a sale which is 
accomplished by the making of the contract. 
(2) Goods or conduct including any part of a performance are 
"conforming" or conform to the contract when they are in accordance with the 
obligations under the contract. 
70A-2-301. General obligations of parties. 
The obligation of the seller is to transfer and deliver and that of the buyer is 
to accept and pay in accordance with the contract. 
70A-2-302. Unconscionable contract or clause. 
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(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the 
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse 
to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the 
unconscionable $lause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable 
clause as to avoid any unconscionable result. 
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any 
clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable 
opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to 
aid the court in making the determination. 
70A-2-313. Express warranties by affirmation, promise, description, sample. 
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows: 
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the 
buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the 
bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the 
affirmation or promise. 
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of 
the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to 
the description. 
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the seller 
use formal words such as "warrant" or "guarantee" or that he have a specific 
intention to make a warranty, but an affirmation merely of the value of the goods 
or a statement purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or commendation of the 
goods does not create a warranty. 
70A-2-314. Implied warranty—Merchantability—Usage of trade. 
(1) Unless excluded or modified (Section 701-2-316), a warranty that the 
goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a 
merchant with respect to goods of that king. Under this section the serving for 
value f food or drink to be consumer either on the premises or elsewhere is a sale. 
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as 
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract 
description; and 
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within 
the description; and 
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; 
and 
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, or even 
kind, quality and quantity within each unit and among all units involved; 
and 
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(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the 
agreement may require; and 
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the 
container or label if any. 
(3) Unless excluded or modified (Section 70A-2-316) other implied 
warranties may arise form course of dealing or usage of trade. 
70A-2-315. Implied warranty—Fitness for particular purpose. 
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any 
particular purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on 
the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless 
excluded or modified under the next section an implied warranty that the goods 
shall be fit for such purpose. 
70A-2-316. Exclusion or modification of warranties— 
(1) Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express warranty and 
words or conduct tending to negate or limit warranty shall be construed wherever 
reasonable as consistent with each other; but subject to the provisions of this 
chapter on parol or extrinsic evidence (Section 70A-2-202) negation or limitation 
is inoperative to the extent that such construction is unreasonable. 
(2) Subject to Subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied warranty of 
merchantability or any part of it the language must mention merchantability and in 
case of a writing must be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any implied 
warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by a writing and conspicuous. Language 
to exclude all implied warranties of fitness is sufficient if it states, for example, 
that "There are no warranties which extend beyond the description on the face 
hereof." 
70A-2-507. Effect of seller's tender — Delivery on condition of payment. 
(1) Tender of delivery is a condition to the buyer's duty to accept the 
goods and, unless otherwise agreed, to his duty to pay for them. Tender entitles 
the seller to acceptance of the goods and to payment according to the contract. 
(2) Where payment is due and demanded on the delivery to the buyer of 
goods or documents of title, his right as against the seller to retain or dispose of 
them is conditional upon his making the payment due. 
70A-2-513. Buyer's right to inspection of goods. 
(1) Unless otherwise agreed and subject to Subsection (3), where goods are 
tendered or delivered or identified to the contract for sale, the buyer has a right 
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before payment or acceptance to inspect them at any reasonable place and time 
and in any reasonable manner. When the seller is required or authorized to send 
the goods to the buyer, the inspection may be after their arrival. 
(2) Expenses of inspection must be borne by the buyer but may be 
recovered from the seller if the goods do not conform and are rejected. 
(3) Unless otherwise agreed and subject to the provisions of this chapter on 
C.I.F. contracts (Subsection (3) of Section 70A-2-321), the buyer is not entitled to 
inspect the goods before payment of the price when the contract provides to 
inspect the goods before payment of the price when the contract provides 
(a) for delivery "C.O.D." or on other like terms; and 
(b) for payment against documents of title, except where such payment 
is due only after the goods are to become available for inspection. 
(4) A place or method of inspection fixed by the parties is presumed to be 
exclusive but unless otherwise expressly agreed it does not postpone identification 
or shift the place for delivery of for passing the risk of loss. If compliance 
becomes impossible, inspection shall be as provided in this section unless the 
place or method fixed was clearly intended as an indispensable condition failure of 
which avoids the contract. 
9. "Inspection" under this section has to do with the buyer's check-up 
on whether the seller's performance is in accordance with a contract previously 
made and is not to be confused with the "examination:" of the goods or of a 
sample or model of them at the time of contracting which may affect the 
warranties involved in the contract. 
70A-2-714. Buyer's damages for breach in regard to accepted goods. 
(1) Where the buyer has accepted goods and given notification (Subsection 
(3) of Section 70A-2-607) he may recover as damages for any nonconformity of 
tender the loss resulting in the ordinary course of events from the seller's breach as 
determined in any manner which is reasonable. 
(2) The measure of damages for breach of warranty is the difference at the 
time and place of acceptance between the value of the goods accepted and the 
circumstances show proximate damages of a different amount. 
(3) In a proper case any incidental and consequential damages under the 
next section may also be recovered. 
Other Statutes: 
78-15-6. Defect or defective condition making product unreasonably 
dangerous — Rebuttable presumption. 
1 C 
In any action for damages for personal injury, death, or property damage 
allegedly caused by a defect in a product: 
(1) No product shall be considered to have a defect or to be in a defective 
condition,'unless at the time the product was sold by the manufacturer or other 
initial seller, there was a defect or defective condition in the product which made 
the produce unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer. 
(2) As used in this act. "unreasonably dangerous" means that the product 
was dangerous to an extent beyond which would be contemplated by the ordinary 
and prudent buyer, consumer or user of that produce in that community 
considering the product's characteristics, propensities, risks, dangers and uses 
together with any actual knowledge, training, or experience possessed by that 
particular buyer, user or consumer. 
(3) There is a rebuttable presumption that a product is free from any 
defect condition where the alleged defect in the plans or designs for the product or 
the methods and techniques of manufacturing, inspecting and testing the product 
were in conformity with government standards established for the industry which 
were in existence at the time the plans or designs for the product or the methods 
and techniques of manufacturing, inspecting and testing the product were adopted. 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(2) (j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
78-27-56. Attorney's fees — Award where action or defense in bad faith — 
Exceptions. 
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a 
prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense to the action was 
without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith, except under Subsection 
(2). 
(2) The Court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against a 
party under Subsection (1), but only if the Court: 
(a) Finds the party has filed an affidavit of impecuniosity in the action 
before the court; or 
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees under 
the provisions of Subsection (1). 
49 United States Code 
49 § 32710. Civil actions by private persons 
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(a) Violation and amount of damages. — A person that violates this 
chapter or a regulation prescribed or order issued under this chapter, with intent to 
defraud, is liable for 3 times the actual damages or $1,500, whichever is greater. 
ADDENDUM B 
PORTIONS OF RECORD ON APPEAL OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO 
ITS DETERMINATION 
1. Motor Vehicle Contract of Sale 1 & 2 
2. Buyers Guide 3 & 4 
3. Dealer Registration Record 5 
4. Bond of Motor Vehicle Dealer, Saleman, or Crusher 6-9 
5. Reassignment of Title - Owner(s) Transferor and Odometer Disclosure .10 
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tamed herein, ue+d vehicle: 
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PROPERTY TAX DUE 
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USED TRADE-IN ANO/OR OTHER CREDITS 
MAKE OF TRADE-IN MILES 
YEAR BOOY TYPE SERIES 
VIN NO. 
ftAl AMCF OF f OWPD TO 
TO BE PAIO BY PURCHASER 
AOORE8S 
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UNTIL BY: OATE: . 
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BALANCE OWED ON VEHICLE 
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1(1 1 
OTHER TERMS AGREED TO: 
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2. FTC weramy ttetement window sticker 
3. Other 
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Purchaser w^ams that he « „ . o , ^ .
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r^a^^^ 
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^.'ed3;; the8^: T: S T rh,n x d8ys •*•—*•»da,e of me written no,,ce-each ° a n y shaH ^  -' SKSSSES 
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IK may charge purchaser storage fees of $10.00 per day beginning the day of purchase. 
H£Z mlCJeJ"C n b?d . !" o'S p u r c h a s e l « f w m e n l r c q u i f C S r e p a , r a - K & K m a k e s n o ^presentation regarding the timing of the repairs or when the 
pairs may be completed Purchaser acknowledges that K&Kdoes not perform any repair work to vehicles and purchaser buys the vehicle -AS I f . 
the vehicle descnbed in this agreement is damaged, purchaser acknowledges the application for a new title may be delayed until the repairs are 
>mpieted. Purchaser acknowledges thatK&Khas tendered the title to purchaser in lieu of completing a temporary 30 day permit Purcftaatraoratflto 
sve the previous title or other ownership documents m possession of K&Kfor safe keeping until such time as purchaser either personalty aooltoa lor a 
le and registration or completed a temporary 30 day permit following completion of repairs. - f > " - -
the purchaser applies for a Utah Certificate of Title and Registration, the title issued for the vehicle described In this agreement 0 will 0 wW not 0 
iknown indicate that the vehicle is a rebuilt or restored vehicle as defined m Utah Code Annotated § 41-1-36.5 (1) (a) and § 41-1-36.6 (1). 
ABILITY INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR BODILY INJURY AND DAMAGE CAUSED TO OTHERS IS NOT INCLUDED IN THIS AGREEMENT. 
JRCHASER REPRESENTS that he/she is 18 years of age of older 
tie to the vehicle Is to remain vested wlthK&Kuntil purchase price is paid In full, including applicable taxesand licensing fe«s. PurchasergrantsKlKa 
cunty interest superior to any other security interest, in the Subject vehicle to secure payment in full. To perfect the security interest granted under 
is section. K*Kmay retain possession of the vehicle or regain possession of vehicle from any bailee of purchaser. 
> agreement, verbal or otherwise, not contained in writing in this agreement on this document will be recognized. 
»«s agreement is Non-Transferable 
BUYERS GUIDE 
IMPOFrwT: Spoken promises are difficult to enforce. Ask the dealer :•.> put all promises in writing. Keep this 
form. * 
VEHICLE MAKE MODEL YEAR VIN NUMBER 
DEALER STOCK NUMBER (Option*) 
WARRANTIES FOR THIS VEHICLE: 
E AS IS - NO WARRANTY 
« £ > " S * 'JSHHSS^Z ^ L " E P A , R S - " " — ' — — " ° -Ponsib lM, . „ „ „ , repair, r e g a r d , [ any oral statements about the vehicle. 
• WARRANTY 
• FULL D LIMITED WARRANTY. The dealer will pay % of the labor and % of the parts for 
the covered systems that fail during the warranty period. Ask the dealer for a copy of the warranty 
& . e 2 i T / J U V X P S a t i ° n ° f r a r ? " t y C ° V e r a g e ' e x c , u s i o " » ' ^ d the dealeSfeVair o b l l g a S wnaer state law, implied warranties may give .you even more rights. 
— " V «... r 
- 1 ^ . 
-> I 
I V . . I . . . 
n \J 
civeraa^dArtM^Tw- °J' A S e r ! i c e c o n t r a c t is available at an extra charge on this vehicle. Ask for details as to 
l ~ T m ^ 
M E C H A N ! ? ^ , F Y O U M A ^ H A V E T H I S V E H , C L E INSPECTED BY YOUR 
m!v I c " fnCuK,2TJilL! !2l?!?.!?r JmPorta"« additional information, includina a list of some major defects that 
ow is a list of some rndjor defects that may occur in used motor vehicles. 
* 4 Body 
ime-cracks corrective welds or rusted through 
gt acks—bent or twisted frame 
leakage excluding normal seepage 
icked block or head 
Its missing or inoperable 
c>cks or misses related to camshaft lifters and 
lush rods 
wmai exhaust discharge 
mutton 4 Drive Shaft 
•roper fluid level or leakage excluding normal seepage 
icked or damaged case which is visioie 
>ormat norse or vibration caused by fautty transmissron 
f dnve snaft 
>roper shifting or functioning in any gear 
neat ckuch slips or chatters 
NttfeJ 
roper fluid level or leakage excluding normal seepage 
eked or damaged housing which is visible 
lormai noise or vibration caused by faulty differential 
ig 9ys«efft 
kage including radiator 
roperiy functioning water pump 
keel System 
ery leakage 
roperiy functioning alternator generator battery or starter 
>4e leakage 
gee or warning devices 
?oodffeoner 
tor 4 Oetroeter 
Brake System 
Failure warning light broken 
Pedal not turn under pressure (DOT spec) 
Not enough pedal reserve (DOT spec.) 
Does not stop vehicle in straight line (DOT spec) 
Hoses damaged 
Drum or rotor too thin (Mfgr Specs) 
Uning or pad thickness less than 1 /32 inch 
Power unit not operating or leaking 
Structural or mechanical parts damaged 
Steering System 
Too much free play at steering wheel (DOT specs) 
Free play in linkage more than % inch 
Steering gear binds or jams 
Front wheels attgrted improperly (DOT specs.p* 
Power unit belts cracked or slipping 
Power unit fluid level improper 
dill )omt seals <dsmafed 
Structural parts bent or damaged 
Stabilizer oar disconnected 
Spring broken 
Shock absorber mounting loose 
Radius rod damaged or missmg 
Rubber bushings damaged1 or messing 
Shock absorber leaking or functioning improperly 
Tires 




Visible cracks, damage or repairs 
Mounting bolts loose or missing 
Z^*?Z- 7* / £ ^ € ^ a V Jg/ 
*5t^L 
I COMPIAJMTS 
KNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF A COPY OF THIS BUYERS GUIDE. 
4sr<^+ f- k* f? 
CUSTOMER SIGNATURE DATE 
(RTANT The information on this form is part of any contract to buy this vehicle. Removal of this label before 
jmer purchase (except for purpose of test-driving) is a violation of federal law (16 C.F.R. 455) . 
DEALER REGISTl ION Rl )RD 
. 7 .H <TfiT£ - ; . ; C O M M I S S I O N . M O T O R VEHICLE DIVISION -QOS .^OTOR AVENUE. oALT LArsg C i T v UT 3 4 I :»3 tdOl> S 3 8 - 3 : 
1. CAR T R U C K _ TRAILER MOTORCYCLE SNOWMOBILE OFF-fr 
C."~OWNER INFORMATION ~ EASE PRINT OR TYPE SHADED AREA FOR OFFICIAL USE Of* 
. - .> : : - . , .VP. . ~ r v < ^ ft. ^ ^ . w r o ^ < ^ ! t A EXPIRATION MONTH/YEAR NEW PLATE * 
^C/xlCC* c ^ ^ ^ S > ^ TM^ AN/ ^ S / MAR- 65 7 ( 
APR- '.•AV
 t wN 
. 'MY r - ^ _ 
-UG' i lT i£? 
.v-isv.cwo ••••.-wr *r .i" i2l2L. ..:jNTv«)kAi 
JJL. -uG T I  i£  PREVIOUS RE 
JTAH PLATE . " ^ ^ 
3. VEHICLE INFORMATION SXPIRAT'CNCATE""' 
.IF.?". ^£a}EA5.Vw5fN.*bi?.±jH2. 
EVIDENCE OF OWNERSHIP.- ^ _ ^ , 
•TAH TITI.E \ ; '^ (L* C ^^<^ <y 
t C ! Sure T,:u? 
^sKt.:r ^ v.-.JCf iV..? ,SC 
2z~t' Of JW • ' Mr-:*^  L vn 
PLATE TRANSFER INFORMATION 
\ ^ * • . ""••r-A\E ":jE:; r =cv.rdS V..N 
1. CDOMETER DISCLOSURE STATEMENT -*i?vous =:ATE- =REVOUS v.s-3.-? 
unt«»f ocometer readme exnctly as shown in sellers rtis-
 A 
closure on current title.* CURRENT TRANSACTION INFORMATION 
•£•>*. :*NE 
V L A ^  M.M;*oe ' T r a n s T y p ! _ u P , a t e T y p e Special 
-.Cwe «^e*os mrainca ^  i - & * » « * < * — Personalized _ F o r ^ 
-,,; Actual M*t*cK P t o t e T r a n s T e r D i s a o , e a * * " * 





6. FOR VEHICLES FINANCED BY LOAN 
ADCRe s £ 





1 ^ i 












Nat I Guam 
Exemot 
_ _ Apportioned 
750 Trailer 
PROPERTY TAX CLEARANCE 








7. FOR FLEET VEHICLES ONLY j VIN VERIFICATION (ALL OUT OF STATE VEHICLE 
11 have oersonaily msoeaed the ventcie oescnoea m section 3 ana 
- . . : : . . * : NUMBER FLEET NUMBER | o e s c n o T , o n t 0 < * c o r r e c t « * $ f t o w n 
* : - E C * :P APPORTIONED INTRASTATE EXEMPT j 
8. PURCHASE AFFIDAVIT 
*Q7AL PURCHASE PRICE S . 
-ESS ALLOWANCE ?OR TRADE-IN VEHICLE S_ 
NET -'JRCHASE PRICE S . 
T B A D E - N vr -nane 
'RADE-N ViN OR 
SIGNED (PEACE OFFICERi ENFORCEMENT AGENCY 
SALES TAX CALCULATION 
Local Coce BHI Of Sale? Fair Market Value S 
Less Trade-in Fair Market Value 3 
Net Fair Market Value S 
Sales Tax Due S 
Less Sales Tax Paid To Another State S 
• E M P T STATE R E A S O N _ _ ! Net Sales Tax Oue IOT Resale Tax * ) 
9. AFFIDAVIT OF OWNER(S) I LICENSED DEALER REPORT OF SALE 
•V- •••: . " . M V W •>:*»*• *w vive* ••*.«« * .c*c: to^ehfn soeaf*4 -n s«*cton 6 i \ / +± ' / , * ^ v „ 0 <? ^~ 
:••*.: •.••:.• —• •• •- «vj — it rr*s verwtf- -s jrw: wmt»ernsurea mrougnout its rectstrction
 ( (DeaieTNamet 
A « r -. ,p£. ::-Nf< , / ; .*6E= '/tfittCf H7X i _ _ : N E W USEDJL OEALER NUMBER / ^ ( »\£ 
EACH NAMED OWNER MUST SIGN BELOW j 
<- c\^.->-~ " ' ' , _ 7 ^ ' 0 A T E S O t P * 7 ^ > 9 ^ TEMPORARY PERMIT NUMBER _ i k 
- - u -
 :: h ' ' '"'" ~ I '»ie aocve nameo dealer certify tnat this vervcie nas oeen ceiive 
K '• purchaser nameo heren: That the information in this reoort is true ai 
— — • .ma comoiies with UC4U3-2: ano that, in the reocrtinq of sales ar 
as reouirea oy UC 59-12-^07/91: 
-;B"r.:~ BED AND SWORN BEFORE V£ THIS CAY OF 
V I am current, or i am nor current. 
..«.AM:NER COMMISSION E A P I R E S ! i / 
• k signature of dealer o r authorized reoresentativei 
i EXAMINING OFFICER NUMBER 
04/09/96 :io FAX .4 797 9495 OLD REP SURL 13002/C 
BOND NO- IJT.T-10fi1Sng 
BOND OF MOTOR VEHICLE DEALER, SALESPERSON, OR CRUSHER 
KNOW AUL PERSONS BY THESE PRESENTS: That we, t^m *nH gar#»n Cnnrvrar dahr KM ^ U c 
of (Street Address), 9RS7 <;n PA/JHAH^ PH ^ 1 f T.n1r#> C l f y , TIT 
(City), County of S a l t L*ICA _ _ «Utah, as Principal anc 
(VM ItAntihUr Snt-gfy rnmpany a Surety Company qualified and authorized to dc 
business in the State of Utah, as Surety, ere jointly and severalty held end firmly bound to the people of the State of Utah tc 
indemnify persons, firms, and corporations for loss suffered by reason of violation of the conditions hereinafter contained, in the 
total aggregate annual sum of y^ppt-y Thnncflnri ar>d Tm/1O0 «.~ Dollar 
(S 9 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 ), as required by CWpterS. Tide 41. Utah Code Ann. (19S3, as amended), lawfu 
money of the United States tor the payment of which, well and trusty to be made, we bind ourselves, our heirs, 
executors, administrators, successors and assigns, jointly, severally and firmly by these presents. The total aggregate annua 
liability on this bond to ell persons making claims may not exceed $ 2 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 as set fortf 
in Chapter 3. Title 41, Utah Code Ana (1953. as amended). 
THE CONDITION OF THIS OBLIGATION IS SUCH. That 
WHEREAS, the above bounden Principal has applied for a license to do business as a lta#»ri 
Motor Vehicle Dealer .___m^__ within the State of Utah, and that pursuant to the application, a licerw 
has been or is about to be issued. 
NOW. THEREFORE, if the above bounden Principal shaH obtain said license to do business as sue 
Used Motor Vehicle D e a l e r and shall well and trod 
observe and comply with all requirements and provisions of THE ACT PROVIDING FOR THE RE6ULATJ0N-AND CONTROL 0 
THE BUSINESS OF DEALING IN MOTOR VEHICLES, as provided by Chapter 3. Title 41, Utah Code Ana (19S3, as amended), an 
indemnify persons, firmsand corporations in accordance wtth Chapter 3, Title 41, Utah Code Ana (19S3, as amended), forte 
suffered by reason of the fraud or fraudulent representafions made or through the violation ofanyofthe provisions of Chapter 
Title 41, Utah Code Ann. (1853, as amended) or any law respecting commerce tn motor vehicles or role respecting commerce i 
motor vehicles promulgated by a licensing or regulating authority so that the total aggregate annual liability on the bond to * 
persons making claims may not exceed $ 7 0
 r OOP. 0 0 — - — — - - - . as set fbcthin Chapter 3, Title 41, Ut 
Code Ann. (19S3, as amended), on account of fraud or fradulent representation or for any violation or violations of said laws or nil 
during the time of said license ead oil lawful renewals thereof, then the above obligation shall be null and void, otherwise to rema 
in Ml force and effect Said bounden Principal shall also pay reasonable attorneys' fees In cases successfully prosecuted or settk 
against the Surety or Principal if the bond has not been depleted. 
The Surety herein reserves the right to withdraw as such surety except as to any EaKfity already incunred or accrued hereunder aJ 
may do so upon the giving of written notice of such withdrawal to the Principal and to the Motor Vehicle Enforcement Divlsk) 
provided, however, that no withdrawal shall be effective for any purpose unH sixty days shall have elapsed from and after ti 
receipt of such notice by the said Administrator, and further provided that no withdrawal shall in anywise affect the Cabffity of sa 
Surety arising out of fraud or fraudulent representafions or tor any violation or violafions of said laws or rules by the Pnnap 
hereunder prior to the expiration of such period of sixty days, regardless of whether or not the loss suffered has been reduced 
judgement before the lapse of sixty days. 
Signed and Sealed this 22 day of J a n u a r y
 # 19 93 
KfrK S n i p s — 
Principal 
OLD REPUBLIC SURETY COMPANY , .Sure 
BY Approved as to Form A™ rui-n/4 
Office of the Utah Attorney Genera l Mvrel G. M i t c h e T ! y 
0 4 / 0 9 / 9 6 . : l l FA. *14 797 9495 OLD REP SUR*-iT @)0 
INDI"")UAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF PRIN<~*AL 
STATE OF UTAH $$ 
COUNTY OF
 m 
Onthb day of .intheyear .before mo personalty appeared .
 m 
to mo known and known to mo to bo the pocson. and described in. and who executed tho foregoing instrument, and acfcnowtodged to me 
executed the same, 
(SEAL) 
Notary Public 
PARTNERSHIP OR HRM ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF PRINCIPAL 
STATE OF UTAH ^ 
COUNTY OF 
Onthb dayof ,ia the year .before mo personally appeared 
tomefcnownandtaowjitomotobeooeofthefrmof _ _ _ 
described in, and who executed the same as and for the act and deed of said fern 
(SEAL) 
Notary PubOc 
CORPORATE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF PRINCIPAL 
(TO BE COMPLETED BY CORPORATION WITH CORPORATE SEAL) 
STATEOFUTAH 33 
COUNTYOF 
On this dayof /mthoyear .before me personally appeared 
tometoowrw«^boingtymedu(yswon\tfdde^^ 
that hob oftha _ _ • the corporation dc 
in and which exocutod the above instwrneot that teto>ew the seal of said c ^ ^ 
(CORPORATE SEAIJ (NOTARY SEAL) 
Notary Pubfo 
CORPORATE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF PRINCIPAL 
(TO BE COWPLETH) BY CORPORATION WTTHOUT CORPORATE SEALJ 
STATEOFUTAH 5 $ 
COUNTYOF 
On this dayof .hthoyear , before me personally appeared 
ton^>rown,vrtK^be^tyroodutyswoa^ 
that hob the oftha . the corpora*: 
executed the above Instrument and * t ^ 
authorized to <fo so tjy Article of the Articles c* incorporation of the saW oorporafion, and by ontof of th 
of Directors of said corporation, end that hfe signage as it thus appears in the abore 
(SEAL) 
Notary Pubfc 
AFFIDAVIT OF QUAURCATION 
STATEOFUTAH 3 3 
COUNTYOF SflTf- T a V o 
_ + MyY-oT a Mjt-#»fr»11
 m being first duty sworn, on oam« 
and says that he b the A t f o r n p y - i n~Fflc.f- of said company, and that he b duly at 
to execute and detiver the foregoing obGgalSons; that said company b authorized to execute the same and has complied in afl respects with the 
Utah in reference to becoming solo surety upon bonds, uridertatings and obfigafons. 
V * / U 3 / » 0 11 FAI .4 797 9495 OLD REP SUR JL l£|004, Old Republic 
"Coapany" means as Interests) inayapp^ to 
Surety Company, e^oraiiyalfflaiedca^^ 
co-suroty(los) arid aiiy eoietyf**) *hich have baan pracared to execute lha bonoft). their successors or assigns. RilS li 
SUHhHtUH INSUttWOE SERVICE' 
1401 East 3900 South, Suite E 
Salt Laka cay, Utah 84124 
ACCMCYCOOeiKX BONO NO* 
[UUZJOS/SO, 
• • v C U a t t ^ ••#•« 
L APPUCWITON FOR MISCELLANEOUS BOND 
Application is hereby made to tha Company lor a bond* suretystife to the penalty of $ 
in favor of 
tOgQVf _ 
"2^^ ^og? 
,,beg|flntog. \\u^ a .1 ,55 
Social Security No,, 1. NaitwofappGckM. 
2. Business Addrae*. fUL ouk TV Ty//f aug^-nlt^ Z~73 g g j . 
RwW*oeaAcJ*»«_ 
1 Oucripooncttppflcanft business 
How long engagrt tfMAin? 
4. RnancUI«awma<*o<«ppUc»nc«aof' 
*****
 m /{<*& fjtf ptff*" <*£*<«—&Jr~ 
w * . <?7/<r£7\ 
II. WHERE REQUIRED, ATTACH CURRENT FINANCIAL STATEMENT OR COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING 
Cash 
Cash in 
v> (^*/</f*i\ &HJC 
.Bank 
.Bank 
Cesh in office, including check tor deposit. 
Slocks, bonds, etc. (market value) constating of. 
Notes receivable.. 
D u e _ _ How secured?. 
Accounts receivable _ _ 
teas than 30 days old %m 
30-60dayso»d S. 
OvereOdaysold $ . 
Merchandise, inventories, etc. (at cost). 
Equipment (coneervative value) _ _ 
Reel estate (give location, tieecription and 
appraised value o( each; 
2.. 
3.. 
i o cl ch parcel) 
Other assets. tf any; consisting of. 
Total Asaets 
& & * 
2<S<Q f 0 











Due afffyr, rfow secured? W*r6f*^&z. 
Notea payable. .Bank 
Due Howsecured7« 
Other notes payable 
Due. How secured?. 




profits taxes. Reserve for Income and 




Real aetata mortgages (grve amount on each parcel) 






Surplus and undivided profits. 
Net Worth (If Individual or parbvxship) 
Total Equity 
TbtaC Uabfflttea * Equity 
5S99V2-
Vfff** 
jA & Are you liable as endorser or surety lor others?. 
6. Are there any lawsuits. Judgments or Kens pending against you?
 w 
7. Are you Inteceetedln any other Bne of business? _ _ 
y<5* 
a Whet surety cc*upany previously exoaited yc<>r bonds?. , 6a. Reason for rtitnrjtr? ^ ^ r ^ r<^c^U/^ 
0 . Hav« v o u ttnol««d l o •«*/ flttw^ ***** 4VM«%*< 
U4/uy/*b* : 1 I FAA '.4 797 9495 OLD REP SURE (£1005/00 
III. INDEMNITY AGREEMENT 
Tha undarslgnod Applicant and Indemnitors, r*mtiy cer% art rerxeser* to Inforrr^to ^ 
Sumty for a r t furnish to above bort a r t such otorbortf^^^
 e n e 
or eJtomdontrtereof.hen»t>y authorizes e r t request 
concomingenytrartsactionvHihtotjno^rs^^ 
execute saJd bonoXs). the tindarslonad aorae ac follows: ^ 
liability Is furnished satisfactory to tha Company. (2) 16 i«j<mu)lfyihoGocnpaty and told H 
of whatever iclnd and nature including but not limited to irweetigauve, accotinCng, engineering, the fee and disbursement of counsel whether on salary, retainer or other*!* % 
the Company may sustain or incur for or by reason of said Company writing said bortfs) to enforce the right of the Company to any colateral taton specifically or otherwise 
requested, to place the Company In funds immediately to meet any ci^mrx demand befom the Compel shafl be require 
assign, transfer and convey to the Company aft rights, title, interest and estate In and to eM property, real, personal or mooed, tangible or Intangible, wherever situated or of whe 
nature and aH Interests and rights now owned and hereafter eajutrrtart Hsott to prooseds therefrom, to foregolr^ 
aX goods, consumer or otherwise, alt cwnmerda!rjaper.negc*lebtoc* 
of lading and other documents of title: a l securities, investments or otherwise: aft accounts, receivable or otherwlsa: an contract rights: aN equipment, machine*, tools and pa 
a l furniture and fixtures; all general Intangibles: aH faim products: afllnw**tory and afl prop 
have or hereafter acquire an Interest, the assignment being effective ae of the date hereof, unless there Is no abandonment of. breach of, delay or default in the performance c 
obllg^lons contracted m rx covered In such bond or of this a ^ 
any and all obligations which might constitute a claim under such bwi&tS) To authorize to 
under this agreement and to attach the same thereto at any lime and when aoached shall by reference be Incorporated herein: and In addition, shea be authorized to file or r» 
this agreement and attachments or a copy thereof under any rxovisionof lawgoverrUngtucft 
Cooe with wjchexJtftiorc as r*edrt to pem>ft to 
with the right, but not the obCgatbn to exercise ex rights asefenrt. trejisfor a r t set over to to Company ar t m 
be obligated, additional documents deemed necessary to give fui effect to the aselgnmenL (7) lb authorize the Company to adjust, eettie or compromise any claim, demand, 
or judgment upon aald bond(s) and defend auch suit a ^ appeal such judgmem oral ks ejection to r ^ 
or any appeal, wrk or error, certtorarf of ewpe/t thereto disrnissed a r t 
voucher(s)ertlterntzrtsuteinent(8)swo^ 
exempt from levy, execution, sale or legal process \tn6tt the lew of any StatefS) including any tpeclflo law or statute Imldng to lability of the undersigned. (10) At the Compj 
option, monies due or to become due the undersigned from any Company m Old Republic Intemationel General Insurance Group, through Insurance proceeds or booolng peyq 
may be utilized to pay or help pay obtigauons incurred uod^r this ac/eement aa an offset (TT) la the event of any payment by the Company, Irtemnttors agree to pay to Com 
Interest al the prime rata plus 2% (unless prohibited by lew, then at the maximum rale allowed) aa determined by first National Bank of Chicago. RUnoia. 
The Company may decline to become surety on any bond of the Aopticantand In case it doea act as surety shal have the right to withdraw or cancel same whenever It shal 
fit. wkriout disclosing to reason on wKch its eate^ 
actions may be brought as they accrue and that bringing of suit or recovery of ludgrnentabrf 
arising. Nothing shall be construed to waive or abridge ajiy rights or remedies wttich the Com^ 
shal continue to be bound under this agreement even though Surety may accept or release other Agreements of Indemnity. 
The Applicant agrees that this AprjflcalionsheJ^ doomed to have been mede to 
of to Company's obligations k\ respect thereof shall be deernrt to r*evetaJeenf^ce in to sakiStaietf 
herein contained by an action, arbitration or rjroceedlngbrovgNmtosaJdStatooflncor^ 
agrees tor, In any such action. a^)itration or proceed^ 
where to Company's principal offlce Is located ar t service of pocess may be rtwde on to 
sroflberxoperartcc<iver4eMlntoGxintyw 
option shall ba governedby laws of the said State of Incorr^ oraUon (ewluolng cordite 
be deemed to be located in Breofcfetd. Waukesha County. Wisconsin. 
II any provision(s) or sub-pan of any prevision of Uus Agreement Ic held to bs void or uneoforceebleurt 
snafl not be void or unenforceable thereby, but ahait continue as though such prevision or sub-port of such provleJon were omitted. 
This Agreement Shan bind the undersigned, the heirs, executors, administrators, successors ar t assigns of the undersigned, jointly end severalty. 
AGREEMENT 
FAIR CREDIT REPOKTTNG ACT NOTICE T M s r * * ^ 
As part Of our ur^rwriting procedure, a rountine inquiry may be made which wfI provide information concerning character, general reputation, personal characteristics and i 
of living. Upon requeet. additional Inlorrnation as to to naium art scope of to repo^ 
Please be sure application Is dated, witnessed or attested, signed art notarized In full K l l l i C O X l O V e X * 
DBA. 
The Agreement shall be effective this. •2.i .day of 
Witness or > 
State of. 
Jk By. 
County of. Ja^y JLL> ss 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this .day of. .19 
nitfd9*RK WffiWGton) 
ELIZABETH POTTS 
§230 Soutft Romalne Or. 
Candy. Utah 64070 
My Commission Expires 
August 20. 1995 
applied for. to u i ^ r ^ J ^ n ^ B f f ^ th» kw*<^ft^nltfAMfi\ftfk, until 
.NOTARY PI 
lagreeoregrees In consideration of the Company executing the bond or Instrument herein ^ , ._„ _,
 1 w 
jointly ar t severalty bound thereunder, and by all of the terms, covenants, art conditions thereof: the undersigned admits and declares that It has a material, substantial, snd na 
interest In the performance of the obtlgetlon which tno bond or instrument applied tor is given to secure, or In execution of to bond or Instrument applied for, and asserts th 




^ >{,& oty bx*x> /*>• suJuqrr 
WITNESS:. CLLOJU^ ) 
rcoeiuc ANO STATE CAW 
onmoviotMO A rAtse STAI 
-22L 
tCASSlONMCNf Of 111! C • UWNCH(2»l I NANS' I H ANO 0 0 0 * . fCfi OCCICMJI« 
ifi&R sure THE MCXAUE UKJM mAnyER Of CMNCKJ** or A vu«cu fAnuRE TO COMPLETE A STATEMENT 
tHhNGS At»/On i^ HOONMCNT 
aegneinghu, « w «xttf*««w to * * w4w.lv rto*.r«xd e***n IO the new-owner nj>w*»d to Bw i m w i t e y w e M block cort^wo I (wel lha imJnr»oncd ownertal r««aoy franefer. oor^andeaegnj t f U , 
eelaefend (warrant Ihe tffe to be tree and efaer of e« eno^nUa**^* e«ept * U n « U*w o< * * p # o / * «>>r*4e<i t * * > - wmtwt mat otoc* a« »w» tenhokfar, 0 any 
msmMSMMnnwiniP •^^3;!Wlcy;^1a^w^•I•;•x»l^l«l»K•!I•wul 
I (wej entity thai on t i e dele of lha eUWment M\e cdomov* on lha etovn dear»4*d *«h»ctt werh w * «MI*«O» *»«-» «ecnn>»d and tt*< to lha beet of my/our fcnowfadge artf 
beWtf i«edometef re jd4Vfc l»ohonaof l r«be9e« iQj '
 % I 
I ) f««Wc««»S«eclueim*MQelorlN«w«k^: ^ v | OOOMETER REAC+NQ 
i | teflectolr* amount of mlcageirteeceee of the odometer ovKharvjcef w*4s / • A 
J fa wot ihe eduei mlaao* ay thla wtfvde VttRMNQ OOOMETCH OtSCIgPANCY ^ X / p
 # >^_ 
t not ihe odueJ mlaaae ay thla W>cW VW»/ 
V Print Name of Ownert-)/T*anefc«or or C I He « n:«VT*ei*ef  ompany
 A Pre* Name oTAu¥ovo<l Agon* 
str . S ta te . 
« * < * <«X> tonlht) 
O e t « . 
Notary Serf 
NotKyPwbioofMVCtemifWqOfftcef 
.3TY - / CrT^iUe-L 
a Of Purchaser (New Owner) 
•?**3;a£%S£«l-2r^ 
NEW L I : M . H Q L K n .Name m u * be o r ^ i ^ l 
NAME 
AOOME&S 
CITY . S T . 
- O P -
X 
of Owner/AwtfiorUed AoenT 
S*QnMur« ©f OerihokW Fw*ku*ng tnt*ros* ~ 
Data TkSa 
U*+\ oefUfy that on t ic oete'of I n * atatement t i t odometar on 9+ above deeonbed veActo reed* fro mrWaco hem recorded, end t u t to 9* beet of my/our k / v t e f e e and 
befieflhisodonne«ef«eed«n9 (check one of t i e f e * * * ? ) * 
( ) fonects Ihe actual arteeoe tor f - i * * * « * < 
( ) ieffacUlhaamour<ofinaeaoainOBOeeaof t w odoreeter inocnenjcet Smite. 
( | « < t t t « « a u e f m 4 e e o e f o r f # * % e h ^ V J U W 4 S C < ^ ^ 




P » « NMno of AuChorttnd Ayunt 
- . cur 
m*e« (no lentm) 
Z l 0 _ 
" ^ S v r u t s e o f ireneicrarls) t^ irA (musi be notenxedl 
Sobecdoed and Sworn to o ^ «*»y «rf to 
Notary 8eef 
Notory PubCc or^MV Citemewo Q«<9»r 
HAME.. 
ADOR£SS_ 
C T T Y _ , 







. S T . 
-V 
•ft*iH 
. Z P -
~5on*«ve ry Ownor/Authonted AgenT" ^ C 
^1 3E 




I M cortty t o t on fro dale of 1 * outempnt t w odomaiar on Ihe above described * * • * * • »ced« tha mrfc*** r>e*e ojcorcfad e«d ttui lo tha beet of my/our fcnowicdoa and 
betef t w odometer feedmo (Check one of t i e loeowtng)-
( 1 f e t e b t t i * actum! rivfeao* fa* t»s«eh<ie: 
( ) feflecu Ihe amount of mloaga «»axcees of tv* odcnv«ter rr^chancoi (mite 
( ) fcv not tSeectuafmaceoc lor tfw v«Nc<a W W N » « COC^ETER OtSCREPANCY 




Pnt Name of AtXhoruc«S Kytc* 
_ O t y 
RWWM (ro tenths) 
. Siorvature of Tren»l«ror(s) in mk (mint C* notertted) 
Notary Seal 
rWEW OWNER (ryme flygt, be pnn.5) 
. 1 © -
NAME 
AOORCSS. 
O T Y 
X . 
S4(jnatur« of Pwrchae«r (New Owner) 





. S T . 
ik*« Of O<vrvfr/Aut)toar«<l Aocnl 
S^natur* 0< L^oholOV nokMemg W>(«n»*t 
